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This study documents behavior consistent with herding in voluntary disclosure 
decisions and investigates two possible reasons for this phenomenon. Based on 
theories of social learning and rational herds, herding in disclosure decisions may be 
due to managers’ use of information reflected in the past disclosure decisions of other 
firms (informational herding), and/or managers’ incentives to maintain or build a 
good reputation with investors (reputational herding). Employing a duration model 
for repeated events, I analyze the timing of capital expenditure forecasts for a broad 
sample of disclosing and nondisclosing firms. Results show that a firm’s propensity 
to release capital expenditure forecasts is positively associated with the proportion of 
prior disclosing firms within its industry, thus, supporting arguments of herding. This 
association is significantly higher for less capital-intensive firms and firms operating 
   
in highly competitive industries which suggests that incentives to herd are greater for 
firms facing relatively high competition. To further distinguish between informational 
and reputational herding, I investigate whether the tendency to herd varies with the 
content and precision of other firms’ forecasts, and with the level of managerial 
reputation. As predicted, I find that a firm’s propensity to disclose increases with the 
precision of peer firms’ forecasts and when peer forecasts signal a decrease in capital 
expenditures. Also, I find that herding is greater for managers that are comparably 
less reputable. Overall, the results confirm the existence of herd behavior in capital 
expenditure forecast decisions and that the behavior is driven partly by informational 
and reputational incentives. Extensive sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of 
these results. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Prior studies of disclosure trends and anecdotal evidence from the business press1
suggest wave- or herd-like patterns in voluntary disclosure decisions. While
substantive theoretical arguments for herding in voluntary disclosure decisions ex-
ist, there is scant empirical evidence to either support or refute these hypotheses.
More importantly, there is no empirical work on the underlying sources of herding
in voluntary disclosures. Consequently, the main objectives of this study are: 1)
to empirically document evidence consistent with herding in voluntary disclosure
decisions, and 2) to investigate the incentives for this behavior.
Herding is broadly dened to include any similarity or convergence in behav-
ior brought about by the interaction of individuals or rms (Hirshleifer and Teoh
2003). Theories of social learning and rational herds provide two possible expla-
1 In December 2004, energy companies Burlington Northern Santa Fe and Norfolk Southern
announced their 2005 capital expenditure budgets within a few days of each other (Reuters,
December 2, 2004; PR Newswire, December 2, 2004). Also, in 2001 many airlines succes-
sively released warnings of slumping revenues and earnings (Dow Jones News Service, June
19, 2001). A similar trend is evident in recent disclosures of accounting misstatements and
errors. For example, in October 2003, A T & T Corp. announced an understatement of its
2001 and 2002 expenses just a few days after its rival Qwest Communications announced a
restatement of its 2000 and 2001 results (Reuters, October 21, 2003).
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nations for why rms may choose to disclose in herds.2 First, managers may make
use of private information reected in the past disclosure decisions of presumably
better-informed managers and consequently choose to disclose (termed informa-
tional herding; see Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992;
Welch 1992). Second, managers may follow the disclosure decisions of more rep-
utable managers in order to inuence investors' assessment of their abilities (termed
reputational herding; see Scharfstein and Stein 1990).3
While patterns of herding are evident in various types of disclosures, I choose
to focus on capital expenditure forecasts for the following reasons: First, disclo-
sures of future capital expenditures carry high strategic costs because they signal
a rm's growth opportunities to rivals or potential market entrants. Given these
costs, rms may have incentives to withhold such information and disclose only
when peer rms have released similar information (Chamley and Gale 1994; Dye
and Sridhar 1995; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). I, therefore, expect herding
to be prevalent for forward-looking capital expenditure information. Second, prior
research shows that capital expenditure disclosures are a relevant signal of rm
value and reputation (e.g., Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong 1997; McConnell and
Muscarella 1985). Consequently, I expect herding in capital expenditure disclosure
decisions to be driven in part by reputational incentives.
In addition, forecasting business investment continues to be of keen interest to
2 Managers may randomly converge in their disclosure decisions simply because they have simi-
lar information to disclose and have similar private information of the net benets of disclosure.
While such random convergence has been termed herding in the literature, this study is primar-
ily concerned with herding due to interactions or interpendencies between rms' disclosure
decisions.
3 This study presumes that only managers with privately held information face the disclosure
decision. It does not presume that managers will fabricate information for disclosure if none is
received.
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policymakers, academics, and business economists. Such interest has increased
in recent years as conservative business capital spending has been a major factor
in both the recent recession and the subsequent slow expansion of the U.S. econ-
omy.4 Therefore, focusing on capital expenditure forecasts creates the opportunity
to provide timely evidence of the interaction of forecast releases among rms and
its implications for gauging economy-wide spending.
Using a conditional variance-corrected duration model for repeated events, I
analyze the timing of capital expenditure forecast decisions for 1981 disclosing and
nondisclosing rms over 8 quarters ending in the third quarter of 2001. Theories
of herding argue that the tendency to make similar decisions increases with the
number of rms taking the same action. Consistent with this argument, I nd that
rms' propensity to release capital expenditure forecasts is positively associated
with the proportion of disclosing rms within their industry. This association is
signicantly higher for less capital-intensive rms and rms operating in highly
competitive industries, thus suggesting that incentives to herd are greater for rms
facing relatively high competition. I further investigate the underlying incentives
to engage in herd behavior and nd that the use of information reected in past
disclosure decisions as well as managerial concerns for reputation are both key
factors of herding in capital expenditure forecasts.
Overall, the results support arguments of herding in voluntary disclosure deci-
sions and suggest that rms are employing a wait-and-see approach when deciding
whether or not to disclose relevant information. Moreover, the results suggest that
poorly informed managers and less reputable managers disclose with the herd in
order to gain informational and reputational advantages.
4 In his July 20, 2004 semiannual testimony, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said
that corporate America's investment in xed capital continues to fall short of cash ow even
though the economy is rebounding.
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I also conduct additional analyses to enrich my results. Given that rms may
disclose multiple forecasts across a single disclosure period, I re-estimate the re-
sults separately for each forecast event. While this procedure results in efciency
losses, I nd that the tendency to herd is relatively stable across initial and revised
forecast events. Next, I use two alternative xed effects regressions to control for
unobserved factors which may be independently driving rms within the same in-
dustry to converge in their disclosure decisions. The results remain reliable and
consistent with expectations, thus ruling out random convergence as an alternative
explanation. Last, series of sensitivity analyses show that the results are robust to
alternative measurements of key variables and the inclusion of additional control
variables.
This study contributes to the voluntary disclosure and the rational herding lit-
eratures in three ways. First, I provide previously undocumented evidence of herd
behavior in the voluntary disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts. This nding
strongly support the existence of interdependence among rms' disclosure prac-
tices. Such interdependence is either ignored or treated as exogenous in prior em-
pirical work. Second, I provide evidence that both informational and reputational
incentives are key sources of herding in disclosure decisions. This is in contrast
to most empirical studies of herding which examine only one or none of these two
incentives. Third, the study employs an empirical procedure which is more suitable
for studying disclosure events. The conditional duration model takes into consider-
ation that a rm's disclosure choice is inuenced by its prior disclosure choices and
thus, is well suited for examining multiple rm disclosures. Moreover, unlike tradi-
tional discrete choice models, the conditional duration model allows the probability
of disclosure to vary across time and across forecast events.
This study has several practical implications as it highlights the need for rms to
put in place mechanisms that will induce managers to disclose value-relevant infor-
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mation on a timely basis rather than in response to the disclosure decisions of other
rms. Such mechanisms can be in the form of better contracting practices and/or
corporate governance structures. For instance, recent studies show that corporate
governance structures such as boards and audit committees are positively associ-
ated with both the quality and frequency of voluntary disclosures (see Ajinkya,
Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). Since better corporate
governance increases disclosure forthcomingness, it can be argued that better gov-
ernance reduces incentives to delay disclosure so as to gain informational and/or
reputational advantages from disclosing with the herd.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 2 discusses
the relevant literature; chapter 3 develops the hypotheses; the research methodol-
ogy is presented in chapter 4; chapter 5 details the data and sample selection pro-
cedures, and provides descriptive evidence; and chapter 6 presents the empirical
analysis. Chapter 7 presents a series of sensitivity analyses, and chapter 8 provides
concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Studies of voluntary disclosures
Theoretical studies of voluntary disclosure, assuming credible disclosures and zero
disclosure costs, suggest full disclosure of information will occur due to investors'
belief that nondisclosing rms have the worst possible information (Grossman 1981;
Milgrom 1981). In the presence of xed positive disclosure costs, only rms whose
information implies economic benets above these costs will disclose (Verrecchia
1983). In the literature, the benets of disclosure are often argued to include capi-
tal market benets resulting from reduced information asymmetries. Specic cap-
ital market benets include increased stock valuation and liquidity in equity mar-
kets, increased interest from institutional investors and nancial intermediaries, and
lower costs of external nancing (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Lang and Lund-
holm 1993, 1996; Welker 1995; Botosan 1997; Sengupta 1998; Healy, Hutton, and
Palepu 1999; Easley and O'Hara 2004). Disclosure costs primarily include infor-
mation production and dissemination costs, the strategic consequences of disclosing
commercially valuable information to competitors (Darrough and Stoughton 1990;
Gigler 1994), and the potential costs of legal or regulatory actions (Dye 1985).
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In addition to valuation related benets, self-interested managers may disclose
private information in order to inuence investors' assessment of their ability (True-
man 1986). In this study, managerial ability is dened to include not only the ap-
titude for decision-making but also managerial foresight and performance (Holm-
strom and Ricart i Costa 1986; Sridhar 1994). Therefore, voluntary disclosures sig-
nal managers' good judgement in providing value-relevant information to investors
as well as their ability to anticipate changing economic conditions and adjust the
rms' business plans accordingly (Trueman 1986). As discussed further below, in-
centives to inuence investors' assessment of managerial ability may induce man-
agers to herd in their voluntary disclosure decisions.
2.2 Theories of herd behavior
Extensive theoretical evidence exist on rational herding or behavioral convergence
by individuals and rms in their respective decisions (see Chamley 2004 and Hir-
shleifer and Teoh 2003 for extensive summaries of the literature). The most basic
cause of convergence in behavior is that agents face similar decision choices, have
similar information, and face similar payoffs. Consequently, they can randomly
make similar decisions. While such random convergence in behavior has been
termed herding in the literature, the focus of this study is on convergence due to
the dependence of one rm's disclosure decision on the past disclosure decisions of
other related rms. As discussed in the following sections, this dependence arises
from two main sourcesthe use of information reected in past disclosure deci-
sions (informational herding), and managerial concerns for reputation (reputational
herding).
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2.2.1 Informational herding
Studies of social learning and rational herds show that, in many economic settings,
agents base their decisions largely on the observed decisions of others. This is be-
cause past decisions reect the private information of each acting agent. Using the
information reected in past decisions is rational because gathering supplemental
private information or directly analyzing alternatives can be costly and/or time-
consuming. However, this process can lead to herd behavior, where agents rely
wholly or partly on the information reected in the past decisions of others and
consequently make similar decisions (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992; Welch 1992; Chamley and Gale 1994).1
Following Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), consider the scenario
where a group of industry rms make binary disclosure decisions (disclose or not
disclose) in a predetermined sequence. All managers have similar value-relevant
information, a conditionally independent signal of the net benets or payoffs of
disclosing such information, and can observe the disclosure choices of all preced-
ing rms in the sequence. If the rst few managers receive positive payoff signals
and choose to disclose, then the act of disclosure publicly reveals their private be-
lief that the potential benets of disclosure outweigh the costs. This implicit infor-
mation may then lead the next manager to either update or replace his/her private
belief of the value of disclosure, thus causing him/her to also disclose.2 As shown
1 Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and Welch (1992) model herd-
ing and the onset of informational cascades. Informational cascades is an extreme case of
herding and occurs when an agent ignores his/her private information and relies wholly on the
information reected in others' past decisions.
2 In real economic settings, the net benets of disclosure will vary across industry rms. How-
ever, the act of disclosure clearly reveals that disclosure carrys positive payoffs. While this
revealed information is noisy, it is sufcient to induce other managers to join the disclosing
herd.
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in models of informational herding, the tendency to make similar disclosure deci-
sions increases with the number of managers taking the same action. Therefore, as
more managers choose to disclose (not disclose), the more likely it is that the next
manager will also disclose (not disclose).
In this study, the value-relevant information in question is of rms' future cap-
ital expenditures. While the nature of the information is similar across industry
rms, the information is likely to differ along various lines such as content, quality,
etc. Given this diversity, the above scenario extends to one with a continuum of dis-
closure choices rather than one with a binary choice. For example, a manager can
choose to disclose high or low quality information of either a decrease or increase
in expenditures, or choose not to disclose at all. Even though managers can make
a range of disclosure choices, there is still a discrete difference between disclosure
and nondisclosure. Since the act of disclosure carry specic xed costs, the choice
between disclosure and nondisclosure reverts to a discrete choice set, even though
disclosure has a continuous character (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998;
Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003).3 Herd behavior as in the binary case will still arise but
the rate of convergence will be slower since the amount of information revealed to
other managers is less noisy. For example, if the rst few managers all disclose
information of a decrease in capital expenditures, then their decisions clearly re-
veal that disclosure of a decrease is value-maximizing and thus, may only effect the
decisions of those managers who hold similar information of a decrease.
Another important extension to the above scenario is that in real economic set-
tings the sequence of disclosure decisions will be endogenous rather than exoge-
3 The discrete difference between disclosure and nondisclosure is similar to the option of positive
investment in a project and not investing at all. Chari and Kehoe (2003) provide a model
where the choice between zero investment and a continuum of positive investment amounts
still results in herd behavior.
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nously predetermined, i.e., managers have the choice of deciding not only whether
to disclose but also when to disclose. As demonstrated by Chamley and Gale
(1994), this induces a wait-and-see game where managers strategically delay their
disclosure decision so as to take advantage of the information revealed by others'
choices. Since managers must trade off the opportunity cost of delaying disclosure
and the value of the information gained, then those with precise positive signals
will tend to disclose rst. If the number of early disclosers is large, then this clearly
reveals that disclosure is value-maximizing, thus triggering a disclosing herd. On
the other hand, if no or only a few managers disclose, then disclosure stops and a
nondisclosing herd is formed.
Informational herding and payoff externalities
In the previous section, the decisions of others generate a pure informational ex-
ternality because they convey private information about the value of each choice.
However, in many economic settings, the decisions of others can also generate di-
rect payoff interactions, where an agent's payoff is affected by the actions of other
agents.4 In such cases, herd behavior arises not only from the inuence of con-
veyed information but also from the actual or expected payoff interactions between
agents' actions (Gale 1996; Choi 1997; Khanna 1998). That is, when the payoff
from a particular action increases with the number of agents taking the same action,
then others will be induced to join the herd.
With respect to voluntary disclosure decisions, the models of Dye and Sridhar
(1995) and Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) parallel settings of informational
herding with payoff externalities. In their models, managers follow the disclosure
choices of other managers so as to mitigate negative payoff externalities, i.e., down-
4 In the literature, payoff externalities are also termed network externalities, strategic comple-
mentaries, or strategic substitutabilities.
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ward revisions in stock price. Using a multi-period model, Dye and Sridhar (1995)
demonstrate how a rms' disclosure choice is inuenced by the disclosure deci-
sions of other industry rms and the resulting interactions with investor perceptions
of rm value. Assuming positive correlations among managers' receipt of infor-
mation, Dye and Sridhar (1995) argue that investors can use the disclosures of one
rm to infer whether nondisclosing rms have received information. If investors
infer that a rm is withholding information, they can conclude that the information
is either bad or no news, and subsequently revise the rm's stock price down-
wards. This potential fall in stock price will then induce nondisclosing managers to
disclose their information subsequently. As in the case with no payoff interactions,
the tendency to disclose with the herd increases with the proportion of disclosing
rms within the industry. This is because the more rms that disclose within the
industry, the better investors can infer whether a nondisclosing rm has received
information.
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) provide similar conditions of herding in
voluntary disclosure decisions. In their model, payoff externalities result from
correlations among rms' private information rather than from correlations among
the receipt of information. If rms' information is negatively correlated, then the
propensity to disclose is positively associated with the past disclosure decisions of
other rms. Specically, favorable disclosures by early movers force nondisclosers
to join to herd in order to mitigate investors' perception of bad news and the sub-
sequent reduction in stock price. If rms' information is positively correlated, then
favorable disclosures by early movers increases investors' perception of good news,
thus resulting in upward stock price movements. This positive payoff interaction
reduces the incentives for nondisclosing rms to disclose, hence causing them to
free-ride off the disclosures of early movers.
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2.2.2 Reputational herding
Reputational or agency-based herding is behavioral convergence due to an agent's
attempt to obtain or maintain a good reputation with the principal relative to other
similar agents (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Trueman 1994). While theories of rep-
utational herding arise separately in the literature, the conditions for its occurrence
are identical to that of informational herding (Ottaviani and Sørensen 2000). In this
case, past disclosure decisions generate reputational externalities as well as infor-
mational externalities.
Following from Scharfstein and Stein (1990), managers with a lower aptitude
for making decisions may follow the disclosure choices of managers with higher
aptitudes so as to inuence investors' (the principal) assessment of their ability. If
a manager mimics the decisions of high-ability managers, investors may infer that
the manager has received a signal correlated with that of high-ability managers, and
thus, is of high ability. In contrast, if the manager's decision deviates from those of
high-ability managers, then the principal is more likely to infer that the manager is
of low ability.
2.3 Evidence of herd behavior
Empirically detecting herd behavior is not an easy task. Empirical data on indi-
vidual or rm behavior usually depicts the decisions taken and not the underlying
incentives. Herding is an ex ante phenomenon, and as such there are great chal-
lenges in using ex post data to infer this behavior. Despite these challenges, there
exists substantial empirical evidence of herding in stock trades (e.g., Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1992; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 1995; Wermers 1999),
analyst forecasts and stock recommendations (e.g., Graham 1999; Hong, Kubik,
and Solomon 2000; Welch 2000), and capital investment decisions (e.g., Jain and
12
Gupta 1987; Mei and Saunders 1997).
Many empirical studies of herding fail to directly examine the sources of the
behaviorexceptions include Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Graham (1999), and
Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), which examine reputational concerns in herd-
ing by mutual fund managers, investment newsletters, and analysts, respectively;
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and Wermers (1999), which provide ev-
idence consistent with informational herding in mutual fund trading; and Welch
(2000), which attributes informational externalities to analyst herding. This gap in
the literature stems primarily from the difculty in distinguishing between possible
incentives to herd. Nevertheless, this study attempts to distinguish between these
two sources of herding in the decision to release capital expenditure forecasts.
2.3.1 Evidence of herding in voluntary disclosure decisions
Currently, there is scant empirical evidence of herding in voluntary disclosure de-
cisions. Studies that provide some evidence of herding include Botosan and Harris
(2000), which nds that pressure to conform to or mimic competitors' disclosure
practices is a key factor precipitating the decision to increase the frequency of seg-
ment disclosures. Also, Pincus and Wasley (1994) report that voluntary accounting
changes by rms do not appear to be clustered in time and industry, thus implying
the absence of herd behavior in rule-based disclosure decisions. More generally,
some aspects of the literature argue that various disclosure fads are actually pat-
terns of herding.5 For example, it is now popular for rms to disclose pro forma
earnings along with net income gures in their earnings releases. Firms argue that
pro forma earnings provide a clearer picture of rm performance. However, it
5 A fad is a rapid form of herding. Fads arise when large groups of individuals or rms simulta-
neously adopt a new behavior (Bikhchandi, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998). In such cases, very
little information is transferred among individuals, thus causing the behavior to be fragile.
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is likely that rms are herding in their adoption of this new disclosure technique,
or are exploiting the tendency for investors to herd on information (Hirshleifer and
Teoh 2003).
Bainbridge (2000), through a thought experiment, offers some insights on in-
formational and reputational herding in disclosure decisions. He argues that the
pervasive practice of nondisclosure by rms is possibly due to herding, and that it
may be possible to break such cycles of nondisclosure. If herding is due to reputa-
tional concerns, Bainbridge argues that mandatory disclosure rules may be the only
means of redirecting the herd since the behavior is likely to be sticky. If herding
is due to informational incentives, then wide dissemination of the benets of dis-
closure can break the cycle. However, the introduction of this new information can
trigger rapid shifts toward disclosure.
2.4 Other related studies
This study also relates to prior research on the value-relevance of capital expen-
diture disclosures and the intra-industry transfer of private information among in-
vestors. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) and Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong
(1997) document strong market reaction to announcements of changes in future
capital expenditures. Thus, providing strong support for the impact of such infor-
mation on investors' expectations of rm value and managerial reputation.
Information transfer studies such as Foster (1981) and Han and Wild (1990)
show that the stock prices of nondisclosing rms react to announcements made
by other same-industry rms. Furthermore, Freeman & Tse (1992) and Ramnath
(2002) show that earnings surprises and forecasts of same-industry rms are cor-
related. These ndings suggest that investors use the information of disclosing
rms to update their assessments of nondisclosing rms. More importantly, they
14
indirectly support arguments of informational herding as it can be presumed that
similar transfers of private beliefs occur among rms.
15
Chapter 3
Hypotheses
I expect herding in capital expenditure forecasts to be more apparent for rms
within the same industry. Correlations among rm values, private information,
and/or the receipt of information are greater when rms' operations are similar.
More importantly, the conveyance of private beliefs are expected to be greater
among industry peers. Likewise, managers are expected to be more concerned
about their reputation relative to managers of other same-industry rms. Given
these arguments, the following hypotheses investigate the tendency and the incen-
tives for same-industry rms to herd in their capital expenditure forecast decisions.
As discussed beforehand, herding occurs when the tendency to make one dis-
closure choice increases with the number of rms making the same choice. Hence,
to detect herding, I investigate whether the propensity to release capital expendi-
ture forecasts is positively associated with the proportion of prior disclosing rms
within the industry. The rst hypothesis (in alternative form) is:
H1: The propensity to release capital expenditure forecasts is positively asso-
ciated with the proportion of prior disclosing rms within the industry.
Given the continuous character of rms' disclosure choices, I further investi-
gate whether the propensity to release capital expenditure forecasts varies with the
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content and quality of prior same-industry forecasts. The results of Jorgensen and
Kirschenheiter (2003) suggest that herding will vary with the content of the dis-
closed information. In their model, herding arises when the disclosed information
is favorable (unfavorable) and is negatively (positively) correlated with the infor-
mation held by nondisclosing managers. Even though, in theory, herd behavior can
still arise, there is no empirical evidence to suggest how the tendency to herd differs
along a continuum of disclosure choices. Hence, I refrain from making any specic
predictions of how the propensity to disclose will vary with the information content
of prior same-industry forecasts. The second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: The propensity to release capital expenditure forecasts is associated with
the information content of prior same-industry forecasts.
Despite limited empirical evidence of herding with continuous choices, it is
reasonable to presume that the tendency to herd will be greater when prior same-
industry forecasts are of higher quality, i.e., more precise. This is because the trans-
fer of private beliefs among managers will be greater when the disclosed informa-
tion is more precise. Hence, I expect the propensity to release capital expenditure
forecasts to be positively associated with the precision of prior same-industry fore-
casts. The third hypothesis is:
H3: The propensity to release capital expenditure forecasts is positively asso-
ciated with the information content of prior same-industry forecasts.
Although the conditions for informational and reputational herding are similar,
it is important to separately investigate whether herding in disclosures is driven by
managerial concerns for their reputation. Trueman (1986) shows that high-ability
managers are more likely to release forecasts early, regardless of the nature of the
news. This is because the sooner the forecast is released, the more favorable in-
vestors will assess the manager's ability to make good decisions and to recognize
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future changes in the rm's environment. Low-ability managers who are less certain
of whether to disclose forecasted information may herd in their disclosure decisions
so as to be indistinguishable from high-ability managers. Given these arguments, I
examine whether relatively less reputable managers are more likely to herd in their
capital expenditure forecast decisions. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I expect the
positive association between a rms' forecast decision and the proportion of prior
disclosing rms to be higher for low-reputation managers relative to more reputable
managers. This is stated in the fourth hypothesis.
H4: The association between the propensity to release capital expenditure fore-
casts and the proportion of prior disclosing rms within the industry is higher
for less reputable managers relative to more reputable managers.
Given the strategic nature of future capital expenditure information, it is ex-
pected that the level of disclosure and thus, incentives to herd will vary with the
level of industry rivalry. Some theoretical models suggest that, due to high strategic
costs, the level of disclosure will be lower for those rms operating in highly com-
petitive industries (Verrecchia 1983). However, other models predict that rms in
highly competitive industries will disclose more so as to deter market entry (Dar-
rough and Stoughton 1990; Feltham and Xie 1992). Similarly, empirical analysis
provides mixed evidence of the relationship between competition and the level of
disclosure. For example, Harris (1998) and Botosan and Harris (2000) both nd that
disclosure of segment information decreases with the level of competition, whereas
Shin (2002) nds that competition increases disclosure when rms compete on ca-
pacities and decreases disclosure when rms compete on price.
While mixed evidence exists on the relationship between disclosure and indus-
try competition, studies of herding suggest that incentives to herd will increase with
the level of rm rivalry (e.g., Gilbert and Leiberman 1987; Kennedy 2002). Man-
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agers facing tight competition for capital funds at lower costs may herd in their
disclosure decisions so as to take advantage of the information held by presumably
better-informed rivals. Likewise, reputational concerns due to higher labor market
competition may lead managers to pursue similar disclosure strategies or to con-
form to industry disclosure norms.1 Consequently, I test the following hypothesis:
H5: The association between the propensity to release capital expenditure fore-
casts and the proportion of prior disclosing rms within the industry is higher
for rms facing high competition.
1 Defond and Park (1999) nd greater use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in highly
competitive industries which results in higher CEO turnover in these industries.
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Chapter 4
Research Methodology
4.1 Duration analysis for multiple events
Duration analysis is concerned with analyzing the time to the occurrence of an
event. Duration models are widely used in economics and other social sciences,
and are rooted in industrial engineering and the biomedical sciences where they
are used to describe durations such as the useful lives of machinery and the survival
times of treatment recipients (see Kiefer 1988, for a review of the economic duration
literature). In accounting, duration models are increasingly being applied to various
issues such as the time to nancial distress (Chen and Lee 1993), the time to audit
rm dismissal (Barton 2004), and durations of consecutive earnings increases (Ke
2004).
I use duration analysis to examine the probability of releasing a capital expen-
diture forecast and the extent to which incentives to herd may impact the timing of
these releases. Duration analysis greatly enhances the ability to offer insights into
herding and the temporal dynamics of voluntary disclosure practices. This is be-
cause duration analysis explicitly models the timing and sequencing of disclosure
events and thus best captures the sequential process of herd behavior. Moreover, du-
ration modelsunlike discrete choice modelstake into consideration that a rm's
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propensity to disclose information can change at an inconstant rate over time as well
as allow for the inclusion of time-varying explanatory variables.
Unlike most duration studies, where the respective event occurs only once per
subject (e.g., death), disclosure of future capital spending is repeatable over time.
Traditional duration models treat repeated events as independent and thus do not
consider that subsequent events are likely to be inuenced by previous events. To
address the possible correlation between multiple forecasts, I apply a variance-
corrected duration model for repeated events. Variance-correction models esti-
mate a standard Cox (1972) proportional hazards model and adjust the variance-
covariance matrix to account for unobserved individual- or group-specic effects
(Lin and Wei 1989). In most cases, a sandwich estimator, similar to White's (1980),
is used to produce robust variance estimates.
Let t D 1; :::; T denote a sequence of discrete time intervals (e.g., weeks);
T  1 denote the duration or waiting time to disclosure; and let X denote a vector
of time-varying covariates (explanatory variables). Then, the standard Cox model
is as follows:
h [t j X.t/] D h0.t/ exp [X.t/] (4.1)
where the dependent variable h [t j X.t/] is the hazard rate or probability of dis-
closure during time t conditional on the history of covariates up to time t ,  is a
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vector of coefcients, and h0.t/ is an unspecied baseline hazard.1 The baseline
hazard is the common probability of disclosure given that all explanatory variables
are equal to 0.2 The model uses the duration times for each rm to estimate the
effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of disclosure during time t .
Multiple forecasts by a single rm are naturally ordered events; i.e., the release
of a revised forecast cannot occur before the release of the initial forecast. Given
this ordered process, I use the Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981) (hereafter
PWP) conditional interevent time model for repeated events.3 The PWP model is:
hk [t j X.t/; k   1] D h0k.t   tk 1/ exp [Xk.t/] (4.2)
where hk [t j X.t/; k   1] is the probability of releasing the kth forecast conditional
on the history of covariates and the number of forecasts up to time t ; h0k is the
baseline hazard of releasing the kth forecast; and Xk.t/ is a vector of covariates that
1 In probability terms, the precise denition of the hazard rate is the probability of disclosure
within the short time interval [t; t C1t/ given nondisclosure and a history of covariates up
until time t , i.e.,:
h [t jX.t/] D lim
1t!0
P [t  T < t C1t j T  t; X.t/]
1t
2 Note that the model does not include an intercept term. The intercept term is implicit in the
baseline hazard.
3 Other variance-corrected repeated-events models include the Andersen and Gill (1982) inde-
pendent increments model and the Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld (1989) marginal risk-set model.
However, the Andersen-Gill model lacks the detail and versatility of event-specic models
(Kelly and Lim 2000). The Wei-Lin-Weissfeld model assumes that multiple events occur si-
multaneously, which is inappropriate for this study since forecast events are sequential. In
addition, several recent studies compare the efciencies of all three models and conclude that
the PWP model is preferred for repeated events (Kelly and Lim 2000; Bowman 1996)
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vary across time and each forecast event k.
The PWP model modies the Cox model by allowing the estimation of the haz-
ard function to continue beyond the rst event. A rm is not at riskof releasing
the kth forecast until after it releases the .k 1/th forecast. Accordingly, the number
of rms at risk (the risk pool) at time t for the kth forecast is limited to those rms
that have released k   1 forecasts. In the model, the durations for each rm are
calculated using interevent times; such as, the time to the rst forecast, and the time
between the rst and second forecast. (Figures 1A and 1B depict the ordered fore-
cast process and the data structure for multiple forecasts.) To estimate the model,
the data is stratied by risk pool, and separate baseline hazards are estimated for
each forecast event. While the baseline hazard is allowed to vary with the number
of preceding forecasts, the model does not assume that variable effects also vary
across risk pools.4
I expect the baseline hazard for subsequent forecasts to be higher as managers
have greater incentives to issue forecast revisions in order to preempt investor re-
sponse to large surprises in expenditures, or to reduce the threat of litigation based
on a duty to update or duty to correct a preexisting forecast that is inaccu-
rate, incomplete, or misleading.5 This is consistent with Kasznik and Lev (1995),
4 To allow both the baseline hazard and variable effects to vary across risk pools, the PWP
model can be estimated separately for each event. This should only be done if there are strong
theoretical reasons to justify that both the baseline hazard and variable effects vary across
events. While I do not assume that variable effects vary across risk pools, the results from
estimating the model by risk pool are presented in Section 6 for illustrative purposes.
5 According to Loss and Seligman (2003), the duty to correct arises when a prior disclosure is
inaccurate at the time that the statement was made. In contrast, a duty to update concerns a
disclosure that was accurate when made but becomes misleading due to subsequent events or
circumstances. While a duty to correct has been upheld in securities litigations, it is unclear
whether there is an obligation to disclose under the duty to update.
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which nds that the likelihood of issuing a preemptive earnings warning increases
when a previous forecast exists.
4.1.1 Variable specication and measurement
Based on prior studies of herding, I expect herding in capital expenditure disclosure
decisions to occur in a relatively rapid manner. Hence, analyses are conducted using
weekly time intervals, i.e., t D 1; :::; 52 for an annual disclosure period. Except
where noted, all variables are measured as at the end of week t   1 so as to capture
the impact of predisclosure conditions. Variables are measured using weekly data;
if weekly data is not available, then quarterly data is used. Appendix 1 summarizes
the measurement and specication of the variables outlined below.
Detecting herd behavior
To test H1, I investigate whether a rms' propensity to release a capital expendi-
ture forecast in week t is associated with the proportion of rms within its indus-
try that have released one or more forecasts in prior weeks, i.e., over the intervals
[1; :::; .t   1/]. Consistent with theory, the fraction of prior forecasting rms pa-
rameterizes increasing informational and reputational incentives to follow the past
disclosure decisions of peer rms. The parameter, PCT DI SC ji t 1, for rm i in
industry j as at the end of week t   1, is measured as:
PCT DI SC ji t 1 D
t 1P
tD1
NDI SC jl 6Di;t
N j   1  100 (4.3)
where NDI SC jl 6Di;t is the number of forecasting rms (excluding rm i) in indus-
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try j , and N j is the total number of rms in industry j .6 Industry classications
are as dened by Fama and French (1997). The parameter is scaled by 100 since
percentage points are easier to interpret in the regression results.
Measuring forecast content and precision
While rms have a rich set of disclosure alternatives, I use discrete nite constructs
as measures of the content and quality of other rms forecast. These measures are
then summarized across all prior weekly intervals for each industry thus, creating a
continuous measure of the aggregate information conveyed among industry rms.
An aggregate measure of disclosure choices is well suited for empirical tests of
herding since the behavior arises when there is a preponderance of actions towards
one choice over the others.
The information content of each forecast (I N FO ji t ) is measured as the expected
change in annual expenditures relative to last year's total expenditures. I N FO
equals -1 if the expected change is a decrease; 1 if it is an increase; and 0
if either no change is expected, or ambiguous or no information is disclosed. For
each industry, a summary measure, I N D_I N FO ji t 1, is created, which represents
the information content of all other industry forecasts.
I N D_I N FO ji t 1 D
t 1P
tD1
I N FO jl 6Di;t
N j   1 (4.4)
Since I N D_I N FO represents the direction of industry-wide changes in capital ex-
penditures, I estimate separate slope coefcients for positive and negative changes
in industry capital expenditures. This is done by decomposing I N D_I N FO into
6 For the remainder of the paper, the subscripts i and t are the rm and week indexes, and the
superscript j is the industry index.
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two separate variablesNEG_I N FO which equals I N D_I N FO for negative
changes, 0 otherwise; and POS_I N FO which equals I N D_I N FO for posi-
tive changes, 0 otherwise.7
Forecast specicity offers insight into the quality or precision of the informa-
tion disclosed by other rms. Following Bamber and Cheon (1998), an ordinal
variable, SPEC ji t , is used to measure the specicity of each disclosing rms' fore-
cast. SPEC equals 1 for qualitative forecasts, 2 for open-ended estimates (i.e.,
minimum or maximum), 3 for range estimates, and 4 for point estimates. A
summary measure, I N D_SPEC ji t 1, is created, which estimates the overall level
of forecast specicity:
I N D_SPEC ji t 1 D
t 1X
tD1
SPEC jl 6Di;t
NDI SC jl 6Di;t
(4.5)
I N D_SPEC is ascending in the specicity of prior peer forecasts; thus, a positive
coefcient on I N D_SPEC means that rms are more likely to disclose when prior
industry forecasts are relatively precise.
Measuring managerial reputation
I distinguish highly reputable managers from less reputable managers using For-
tune's annual America's Most Admired Companies survey. Each year, Fortune
7 Note that disclosures of decreases (increases) in capital expenditures are not clear disclosures
of unfavorable (favorable) news. As evidenced by Chung, Wright, and Charoenwong (1997),
the nature of the news is dependent on the growth opportunities of the disclosing rm. Also,
a large number of forecasts in one direction may be because most industry rms make similar
capital expenditure decisions and thus hold similar expenditure information. However, herding
will still arise since each rm is assumed to hold independent private signals of the net benets
of disclosure.
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magazine ask executives, directors, and analysts to rate the top ten companies (by
revenues) in their own industry on eight criteriaquality of management, quality
of products and services, employee talent, innovativeness, social responsibility, use
of corporate assets, nancial soundness, and long-term investment value. While the
Fortune ranking is a global measure of rm reputation, it incorporates peer views
of managerial talent and managerial performance. Moreover, the ranking includes
analyst beliefs of managerial reputation, which, following from prior research, are
assumed to reect the beliefs of investors.
I construct a reputation indicator, REP , which equals 1 for rms with highly
reputable managers; 0 for those with less reputable managers. Those rms in-
cluded in the survey in at least one of the 3 years preceding the current annual
disclosure period are classied as rms with highly reputable managers.8 Firms
excluded from the survey in all three years are classied as rms with less rep-
utable managers. H4 is tested by estimating the effects of REP and the interaction,
REP  PCT DI SC .9
Measures of industry competition
The Herndahl Index (HERF) and the level of capital intensity (CAP I NT ) are
used as proxies for industry competition. The Herndahl Index is a widely used
measure of industry concentration and accounts for the relative size and distribution
of rms within an industry. The index for each industry is calculated as the sum of
the squares of the market shares of each individual rm:
8 Using information from the survey, corporate reputation tends to be stable over time. For
example, most of the ten Most Admired companies in each year were included in the last ve
surveys.
9 Alternatively, I proxy managerial reputation using CEO tenure, CEO age, and two measures of
disclosure credibility. Similar results are obtained when each of these measures are substituted
for the Fortune reputation indicator in the model.
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HERF jt 1 D
NX
iD1
"
SALES ji t 1
I N D_SALES ji t 1
#2
(4.6)
where SALES is quarterly sales, I N D_SALES is the sum of quarterly sales for all
rms in the industry, i.e.,
NP
iD1
SALES ji , and N is the number of rms in the industry.
The index approaches zero when the industry consists of a large number of rms of
equal size as in the case of perfect competition. The index increases as the number
of rms decreases and as the difference in size between rms increases. Greater
values mean higher concentration, less competition, and more market control held
by individual rms.
High barriers to entry decreases competition from existing and potential rivals
by limiting and deterring entry into an industry. The level of industry capital in-
tensity is traditionally used as a measure of barriers to entry. However, I choose
to use rm-specic capital intensity as a measure of barriers to entry for the fol-
lowing reasons.10 First, whereas rms have relatively little control over exogenous
factors of competition such as product market concentration, rms have great con-
trol over the level and nature of their capital investments (Harrigan 1981). Second,
prior studies suggest that potential market entrants pay greater attention to the com-
petitive investments of individual rms rather than collective industry investments
(Rumelt 1991). Third, intra-industry variations in capital intensity may create dif-
ferences in rms' decision to herd on the past disclosure decisions of rivals. For
example, within an industry, less capital-intensive rms may be less informed about
the payoffs of providing capital expenditure forecasts, and thus may gain informa-
tional advantages from herding on the disclosure decisions of high capital-intensive
10 Similar results are obtain when capital intensity is measured at the industry level.
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rms.11 Capital intensity on a rm-specic basis, CAP I NT ji t 1, is measured as
the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (net PPE) to total assets. CAP I NT
is also expressed in percentage points (i.e., CAP I NT  100) for ease of interpre-
tation. To test H5, I estimate the effects of CAP I NT and the interaction term,
CAP I NT  PCT DI SC .
Control variables
Based on prior research, additional incentives to disclose capital expenditure fore-
casts are controlled for as follows:
Deviation from industry capital expenditures The concern for relative perfor-
mance can lead managers to release a forecast if current expenditures deviate from
the industry average. Managers may issue expenditure forecasts to signal to in-
vestors their ability to capitalize on future growth opportunities, or anticipate ad-
verse economic changes relative to their peers. Also, managers may issue fore-
casts in order to offer explanations for deviations which may be viewed nega-
tively by investors. The standardized deviation from industry capital expenditures,
CAPDEV ji t , is measured as:
CAPDEV ji t D
CAP ji t   AVGCAP jl 6Di;t
ST DEV _CAP jt
(4.7)
where CAP is capital expenditures scaled by total assets; AVGCAP is the mean
scaled capital expenditures for all other industry rms; and ST DEV _CAP is the
industry standard deviation of scaled capital expenditures. I allow for different
11 Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) nd similar within-industry differences in herding in capital
investment decisions. Specically, rms with larger market shares invest in opposition of their
rivals, while rms with smaller shares herd.
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slope coefcients on positive and negative deviations from the industry average.
NEG_CAPDEV equals CAPDEV for negative deviations, 0 otherwise; and
POS_CAPDEV equals CAPDEV for positive deviations, 0 otherwise.
Deviation from industry earnings Similar arguments hold when earnings differ
from the industry average. Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2004) argue that
managers often augment voluntary earnings forecasts with explanations for fore-
casted performance. Earnings are usually linked to internal and/or external factors
that help to explain the information. Future capital spending is one such factor.
Hence, differences in earnings relative to peers may trigger the disclosure of future
capital expenditures. For example, when earnings are relatively poor, managers
may disclose adjustments to their capital expenditure plans as a corrective mea-
sure or as an explanation for poor performance. The standardized deviation from
industry earnings, EPSDEV ji t , is:
EPSDEV ji t D
EPS ji t   AVGEPS jl 6Di;t
ST DEV _EPS jt
(4.8)
where EPS is earnings per share excluding extraordinary items; AVGEPS is
mean earnings per share for all other industry rms; and ST DEV _EPS is the
standard deviation of industry earnings per share. Again, I allow for different slope
coefcients on positive and negative deviations. NEG_EPSDEV takes on nega-
tive values of EPSDEV , 0 otherwise; and POS_EPSDEV takes on positive
values of EPSDEV , 0 otherwise.
Level of analyst following Pressure from analysts for proprietary information
may lead rms to increase disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1996). Alternatively,
rms with low analyst following may increase disclosure in an effort to attract -
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nancial analysts (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999). The level of analyst following,
FOLLOW ji t 1, is measured as the number of nancial analysts following the rm.
This measure is based on the last available analyst forecast information in the First
Call database prior to the end of week t   1.
Firm size Firm size controls for the cost of issuing information, which is greater
for small rms, and investor demand for information production, which is greater
for large rms.12 Prior research consistently documents a positive association be-
tween rm size and voluntary disclosures (e.g., Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson
1995). Firm size (SI Z E ji t 1) is measured as the natural logarithm of the market
value of common equity.
Proprietary disclosure costs Capital expenditure forecasts are likely to carry
high proprietary costs, which may deter disclosure. In addition to high capital-
intensive rms and rms operating in highly competitive industries, these costs
are even higher for high-technology (high-tech) rms and rms with high growth
prospects. Following Bamber and Cheon (1998), the ratio of market value to book
value of common equity (MB ji t 1) is used to control for proprietary costs.
Analyst forecast dispersion Firms with high information asymmetry increase
voluntary disclosures in order to reduce investors' incentives to acquire costly pri-
vate information (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002). Dispersion in an-
alyst earnings forecasts is interpreted as a measure of both uncertainty (Swami-
12 An alternative proxy for the demand for information is analyst following. Large rms typically
have larger analyst coverage given the high interest in these companies. Therefore, I expect that
rm size will be highly correlated with the level of analyst following. As detailed in the next
section, this collinearity is corrected for when the variables REP , FOLLOW , and SI Z E are
orthogonalized so as to remove biases of rm size and corporate visibility from the reputation
indicator variable.
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nathan 1991) and lack of consensus (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barron, Kim,
Lim, and Stevens 1998). Therefore, analyst forecast dispersion is seen as a joint
measure of uncertainty and information asymmetry. Analyst forecast dispersion
(DI SPERSE ji t 1) is measured as the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts di-
vided by the median forecast. This is based on the last available analyst forecast
information in the First Call database prior to the end of week t   1.
Liquidity Prior research documents a negative association between liquidity and
voluntary disclosures (e.g., Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999). The level of rm
liquidity (L I Q ji t 1) is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the volume
of shares traded to total shares outstanding.
Issuance of equity and/or debt Prior studies evidence a positive association be-
tween disclosure quality, disclosure frequency, and the decision to issue equity
and/or debt (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993). I SSU E ji tC2years equals 1 if rm
i registers a public debt or equity offering in the two years (104 weeks) following
week t ; 0 otherwise.
Disclosures around earnings announcements Firms tend to increase their dis-
closure of valuable information around earnings releases (Kasznik and Lev 1995).
E ARN REL ji t is coded 1 for each week that annual or quarterly earnings is re-
leased; 0 otherwise.
32
Given the above variables, equation .4:2/ is rewritten as follows:13
hk [t j X.t/; k   1] D
h0k.t   tk 1/ exp
26666666666666666666666666664
1PCT DI SCk C 2NEG_I N FOkC
3POS_I N FOk C 4 I N D_SPECkC
5REPk C 6.REPkPCT DI SCk/C
7HERFk C 8.HERFkPCT DI SCk/C
9CAP I NT k C 10.CAP I NT kPCT DI SCk/C
11NEG_CAPDEV k C 12POS_CAPDEV kC
13NEG_EPSDEV k C 14POS_EPSDEV kC
15FOLLOW k C 16SI Z Ek C 17MBkC
18DI SPERSEk C 19L I Qk C 20 I SSU EkC
21E ARN RELk
37777777777777777777777777775
(4.9)
4.1.2 Additional specications and analyses
Orthogonalizing the reputation indicator
Prior studies of the Fortune survey nd that the ranking is highly positively corre-
lated with rm size and measures of corporate visibility such as press and analyst
coverage (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Brown and Perry 1994). Analyst cover-
age helps to discipline and motivate managers since corporate decisions are closely
monitored and publicized (Chung & Jo 1996). As such, the extent to which man-
agers mismanage corporate assets is likely to be lower for those rms with large
analyst following. In addition, analyst coverage directly affects investors' assess-
ment of reputation by directing their attention to such issues as managerial quality
13 Firm and time subscripts and the industry superscript are suppressed for readability.
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and rm performance. The positive association between the Fortune ranking and
rm size is largely due to the fact that the survey is conducted using the larger rms
within an industry. Also, countless studies nd a positive association between the
level of analyst following and rm size. Hence, the association between the ranking
and rm size may also be interpreted as being due to corporate visibility.
To remove the possible confounding effects of size and analyst following on
the reputation indicator, I orthogonalize REP , FOLLOW , and SI Z E using the
modied Gram-Schmidt procedure (Golub and Van Loan 1996). All estimations
of equation 4.9 are then conducted using the orthogonalized values of these vari-
ables. The interaction between REP and PCT DI SC is also calculated using the
orthogonalized values of REP .
Treatment of tied disclosure events
In Cox regressions, the ordering of events in continuous time is relevant. When
discrete time intervals are used, multiple rms are recorded as disclosing at the
same time (termed tied events). As such, the exact ordering of disclosure events
is unclear. To correct for this, the Efron (1977) method of handling tied events
is used. The Efron method approximates the ordering of events using probability
weights. For example, if rms A and B disclose within the same week, the Efron
approximation averages the probability of rm A disclosing rst and the probability
of rm B disclosing rst.
Nonparametric duration analysis
Before estimating the PWP model, I nonparametrically estimate and analyze the
forecast hazard using the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function,
bH.t/ D TX
tD1
NDI SCt
Nt
(4.10)
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where N is the number of rms at risk during week t , and NDI SC is the number of
rms that released a forecast in week t . The Nelson-Aalen function is based strictly
on the raw data and treats each forecast release as an independent event. Hence, the
Nelson-Aalen estimates may over- or underestimate the true hazard. Nevertheless,
the estimates provide useful preliminary descriptives of the forecast hazard.
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Chapter 5
Data and Sample Selection
Corporate managers often release in the business press an internally generated
forecast of annual capital expenditures in advance of the release of actual spend-
ing in annual nancial reports. I hand-collect forecasts of 2000 and 2001 capital
expenditures for all rms across all industries from the following business press
sources: Business Wire, PR Newswire, The Dow Jones News Service, and The Wall
Street Journal.1;2 Press releases containing forecasts are identied using the terms,
capital budget,capital expenditures, capital investments, capital spending,
long term expenditures, and planned expenditures.3 The disclosure of forward-
looking information is more likely as next year's information arrives during the
current year. Therefore, I collect forecasts of 2000 expenditures from the fourth
quarter of 1999 through to the third quarter of 2000 (4Q 1999 - 3Q 2000) and like-
1 The collection of press releases ends in 2001 since data for the subsequent two years is needed
to determine whether the rm expects to issue equity and/or debt.
2 Similar to Miller and Piotroski (2000), the earliest and most comprehensive disclosures are
identied mostly through the wire services.
3 The search terms are expanded as some rms describe capital expenditures using different
terms. Also, if I discern that a forecast earlier than the one collected exists, then a wide search
using the company's name and ticker symbol is conducted so as to identify the earlier forecast.
This is done so as to identify all initial forecasts.
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wise for 2001 expenditures (4Q 2000 - 3Q 2001). For each forecast, the release
date is recorded and the information content and specicity coded. To be included
in the nal sample, releases must satisfy the following criteria:
1. They must include information directly pertinent to future capital spending
decisions, i.e., quantitative or qualitative information on future capital ex-
penditures, changes in budgeted expenditures, or on planned or incomplete
projects.
2. They must be authored by a company source. Releases authored by a non-
company source, typically a business reporter, are retained if initiated by a
company contact. In most cases, these contain direct quotes from company
ofcials.
3. Press releases that contain the same information as a prior release are elimi-
nated; i.e., only releases that offer new or revised information are retained.
4. If duplicate releases occur on the same date, then either the earliest or most
comprehensive release is retained.
5. Only releases pertaining to expenditures at the corporate or divisional level
are included. Information of expenditures by subsidiaries or partners of a
strategic alliance or joint venture are not considered.
6. All types of releases are retained if they include a capital expenditure fore-
cast; i.e., releases of annual and quarterly earnings, earnings forecasts, cost
reductions, etc. are retained if a capital expenditure forecast is embedded.
7. Only rms listed on the NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX are included.
The necessary accounting and stock price data are collected from the COM-
PUSTAT/CRPS merged database. Analyst dispersion and following are estimated
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using data from the First Call database. Registrations of public debt and/or eq-
uity offerings are determined from the SDC Platinum Global Corporate Financing
database.
Using the above criteria, I identify 1775 capital expenditure forecasts by 878
publicly-traded rms over the 8 quarters, 4Q 1999 to 3Q 2001. The forecast dates
are grouped into 104 weekly time intervals. Eleven rms issued two or more fore-
casts within the same week. Duration models prohibit multiple events by the same
rm within the same time interval. Therefore, for these 11 rms either the earliest
or the most specic forecast is retained. This reduces the number of forecasts to
1763. Of this total, 637 forecasts are of 2000 expenditures while 1126 forecasts
are of 2001 expenditures. This sharp increase is possibly due to the implementa-
tion of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) which took effect on October 23, 2000
or to the economic decline which began in late 2000.4. Studies such as Hein,
Subramanyan, and Zhang (2003) document a substantial increase in the volume of
rms' voluntary forward-looking disclosures after the implementation of Reg FD.
Expected slumps in business performance may have prompted a greater proportion
of rms to forecast adjustments to their 2001 expenditure plans.5
4 In November 2001, the Business Cycle Dating Commiteee of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) ofcially reported that the decline in business activity across the U.S.
economy began in March 2001 (see Business Cycle Dating Committee, NBER, November 26,
2001). However, a recent article in The Wall Street Journal (January 22, 2004) reports that the
NBER is considering revising the start date of the recession to as early as November 2000.
5 The implementation of Reg FD and the decline of the economy in the 2001 period is not
expected to adversely impact the study's results for the following reasons. First, these events
affect all rms in the sample. Second, the duration analysis is conducted separately for each
time period. Results from estimating the model separately for each disclosure period (see
Table 4) conrm these expectations. In addition, the results from the pooled estimation remain
unchanged when a Reg FD indicator variable is included for the week of October 23, 2000 and
all weeks thereafter.
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Given the differences in their disclosure environment, I exclude 56 forecasts by
32 utilities (SIC 49XX) and 32 forecasts by 23 nancial and insurance institutions
(SIC 6XXX) as well as 357 forecasts by 185 foreign rms. To ensure tractability, I
eliminate 319 forecasts by 191 rms with a non-December 31 scal year-end. This
procedure yields a total count of 1021 forecasts (473 rms). To conduct the duration
analysis, I separate the sample into two distinct forecast periodsthe 4 quarters, 4Q
1999 to 3Q 2000, which spans the release of 2000 expenditure forecasts, and the 4
quarters, 4Q 2000 to 3Q 2001, which spans the release of 2001 forecasts. For each
forecast period, the rst week is recorded as t D 1. All rms must exist or be at risk
at the beginning of week 1; i.e., newly entering rms are not added to the risk pool
after week 1. Also, rms must have the relevant data from COMPUSTAT/CRSP and
First Call at the beginning of the period. However, rms are not required to have
observations for the entire 52-week period.6 Based on these restrictions, I eliminate
an additional 91 rms. Using the same restrictions, the data panel is completed
by adding all other U.S. incorporated publicly-traded rms with a December 31
year-end. These rms are categorized as the set of nondisclosing rms.7
Due to the manner in which incentives to herd are operationalized, I include
only those industries with at least two forecasting rms and those with four or more
rms.8 Following Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997) and Brown, Lo, and Lys
(1999), all rms with negative market-to-book values are excluded. These deletions
6 The shortest time-series for any rm in the sample is four weeks. Restricting the sample
to rms with complete information for the full 52-week period reduces the sample size and
creates a survivorship bias.
7 Some rms classied as nondisclosing rms may have issued a capital expenditure forecast
which failed to appear in the search results. However, this should not adversely affect the
paper's ndings.
8 I use 4-digit SIC codes to place each rm into one of 48 industry classications as dened by
Fama and French (1997).
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result in a nal full sample of 139,242 rm/weeks (1981 rms). The 2000 and
2001 sub-samples are 62,675 rm/weeks (1376 rms) and 76,567 rm/weeks (1712
rms), respectively. The forecast count for the full sample is 742 (354 rms). For
the 2000 and 2001 sub-samples, the counts are 236 (161 rms) and 506 (292 rms),
respectively.9
For each forecast period, the sample is separated into three risk poolsrms
likely to release the rst forecast, the second forecast, and three or more forecasts.
I collapse the third and higher forecast event into a single risk pool since few rms
release more than two forecasts. To mitigate the effects of outliers, I winsorize
the full sample and each sub-sample by setting extreme values of all continuous
variables equal to the values at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. I winsorize these values
instead of deleting them in order to conserve the number of observations.10
5.1 Descriptive evidence
Appendix 2 provides examples of capital expenditure forecasts issued by rms in
the transportation and telecommunications industries and their respective informa-
tion content and specicity coding. Figures 2A and 2B depicts the distribution
of the forecast content and specicity, respectively, for the 2000 and 2001 sub-
9 The sum of the number of forecasting rms in each period differs from the total number of
forecasting rms in the full sample because of newly entering rms, exiting rms, some rms
not always issuing a forecast, and failure to identify a forecast from the press sources used.
There are 185 new forecasting rms in the 2001 sub-sample, whereas 54 rms that forecasted
their 2000 expenditures were either not included in the 2001 sub-sample or failed to forecast
their 2001 expenditures. Restricting the sample to all rms that release a forecast in both
periods greatly reduces the number of forecast counts and induces a survivorship bias.
10 Similar results are obtained using both the non-winsorized sample and a sample winsorized at
the 1% and 99% levels.
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samples. From Figure 2A, 25.4% (60 of 236) of forecasts signal a decrease in
capital expenditures for 2000 compared to 42.7% (216 of 506) for 2001. This dra-
matic increase is more likely due to the 2001 recession. From Figure 2B, sample
forecasts are relatively precise since 62.7% (148 of 236) and 66.8% (338 of 506) of
2000 and 2001 forecasts, respectively, provide a point or range estimate. Figure 3
presents the weekly distribution of forecasts. Note that there are distinct spikes in
the distribution in the weeks following the end of each quarter. However, this is not
striking since these increases coincide with the disclosure periods for annual and
quarterly earnings.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the quarterly pattern of capital expenditure fore-
casts along with the Nelson-Aalen hazard estimates as at the end of each quarter.
It is evident that most rms release at least one capital spending forecast within
the last quarter of the previous year and the rst quarter of the current year. The
Nelson-Aalen estimates show that the disclosure rate increases signicantly in the
rst two quarters of each period and then increases at a decreasing rate for the last
two quarters. Also, the disclosure rate is signicantly higher in the 2001 period with
the hazard estimates increasing to 34.55% versus 19.91% in the 2000 period. The
functional form of the forecast rate is further depicted in Figures 4A and 4B, which
plots the Nelson-Aalen smoothed and cumulative hazard functions, respectively, for
each forecast period.11 These plots clearly show that the forecast rate varies over
the disclosure period and is increasing at a decreasing rate.
Since the level of disclosure is expected to differ by industry competition and
rm capital intensity, I estimate and plot comparative cumulative hazard functions
11 The smoothed hazard function is derived by estimating the hazard contribution for each week,
i.e., by taking the steps of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard, cH.t/. More precisely, the
estimated hazard contribution for each weekly interval is 1bH.t/ D bH.t/   bH.t   1/. The
hazard contributions are then kernel smoothed.
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for high- and low-competition industries, and for high and low capital-intensity
rms. An industry is classied as high (low) competition if its Herndahl Index
is less than (greater than) the mean index of the sample (which is 0.14). Like-
wise, a rm is classied as high (low) capital-intensity if its capital intensity ra-
tio is greater than (less than) the mean sample ratio (which is 29.72%). Figure 5
presents comparative plots by industry competition (5A) and capital intensity (5B)
for the full sample while Figures 6 and 7 present comparative plots for each fore-
cast period. Figure 5 show signicantly higher forecast rates for rms operating
in less competitive industries and those with high capital-intensity. This suggests
that high proprietary costs resulting from either high product market competition or
low barriers to entry substantially reduce the propensity to provide forward-looking
expenditure information. Figures 6 and 7 show similar differences between both
disclosure periods. However, from Figure 6, the forecast rate for high-competition
industries increases more so in the 2001 period relative to low-competition indus-
tries. From Figure 7, low capital-intensity rms experienced a relatively greater
increase in their forecast rate across both periods. These ndings may indicate that
the implementation of Reg FD and the economic downturn had a greater impact on
the disclosure strategies of rms facing relatively high competition.
I also estimate and plot separate cumulative hazard functions for each disclo-
sure event. Figure 8 plots the hazard functions for the rst, second, and third or
higher forecast event. It is clear that the propensity to release a forecast revision is
substantially higher than that of releasing the initial forecast. This provides strong
support for the use of the PWP model over other traditional duration models.
Table 2 presents comparative data for sample rms (Panel A) and all rms in
the COMPUSTAT/CRSP database with available quarterly data (Panel B).12 Panels
12 Here, quarterly data are presented instead of weekly data since sales, earnings, and asset-based
information is not available on a weekly basis.
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C and D present descriptives for all quarters in which a rm is classied as either
a disclosing or nondisclosing rm, respectively. For each forecast period, a rm is
classied as a disclosing (nondisclosing) rm if it issues at least one forecast (no
forecast). From Panels A and B, sample rms are slightly larger than the average
rm with a mean market value of equity of $3.865B versus $2.305B and mean
sales of $608.2M versus $427.6M. Sample rms are more capital intensive, but
their earnings performances are comparable to those of the average rm. From
Panels C and D, disclosing rms are signicantly larger than nondisclosing rms
and outperform them.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the forecast durations (Panel A) and
continuous independent variables (Panel B) for the full sample and each sub-sample.
The statistics for the forecast durations are calculated using only disclosing rms.
Statistics for current quarter earnings per share and capital expenditures are also
provided. From Panel A, the mean forecast duration for the full sample is 24.21
weeks. As expected, the mean forecast duration is shorter for 2001 forecasts in
comparison to 2000 forecasts. From Panel B, 8.97% of other same-industry rms,
on average, release at least one forecast. The statistics for the information con-
tent and specicity constructs show that on average most peer rms forecast an
increase in expenditures and that forecast specicity is relatively high. Average
quarterly earnings per share declines dramatically between the two forecast peri-
ods. However, there are no signicant differences in the standardized deviations
from industry earnings across the two periods.
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Chapter 6
Main Results
6.1 The PWP conditional hazard model
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation 4.9. The orthogonalized
values of REP , FOLLOW , and SI Z E are denoted using the subscript O , i.e.,
REPO , FOLLOW O , and SI Z EO . The z-statistics for all coefcients are based
on Lin & Wei's (1989) robust variance estimates. The Efron (1977) approximation
is used to handle tied events. Columns 1 to 3 present the pooled results for the
full sample, whereas columns 4 and 5 present the results for each sub-sample. For
ease of interpretation, I report the percentage change in the forecast hazard given
a one-unit change in each independent variable while holding all others constant.
Since the independent variables have different scales, I also report the one-standard-
deviation percentage change.
The one-unit percentage change in the hazard rate for each variable r is calcu-
lated as 100exp.r /  1. For continuous variables, the one-standard-deviation per-
centage change is calculated as 100exp.srr /   1 where sr is the sample standard
deviation of variable r . For indicator variables, the one-standard-deviation change
is based on a change from 0 to 1 and, therefore, equals the one-unit change. The
one-standard-deviation change for orthogonalized variables also equals the one-unit
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change since orthogonalization produces normalized variables with a standard de-
viation of 1.
The results strongly support H1. Specically, the disclosure rate of capital ex-
penditure forecasts is positively and signicantly associated with the proportion of
same-industry rms that released a forecast in the weeks prior to the current week.
The coefcient on PCT DI SC indicates that, all else equal, a 1% increase in the
fraction of forecasting same-industry rms increases a rm's forecast propensity by
5.76%.
The regression results also provide support for H2. The estimated coefcient
on NEG_I N FO is not signicant for the full sample but is negative and weakly
signicant for the 2000 sub-sample. This provides weak evidence of an increase
in the propensity to disclose when other same-industry forecasts signal a decrease
in capital expenditures. The signicantly negative coefcient on POS_I N FO in-
dicates that rms are less likely to disclose when the majority of same-industry
rms signal either an increase or no change in capital expenditures. This is consis-
tent with the arguments of Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) and suggests that
rms are likely to free-ride on other rms' disclosures of an expected increase in
expenditures relative to disclosures of an expected decrease.
With respect to H3, the estimated coefcient on SPEC shows that a rm's
forecast propensity increases with the specicity of prior same-industry forecasts.
This is consistent with theories of informational herding as the transfer of private
information between peer rms will be greater when disclosures are more precise.
Together, the ndings from PCT DI SC and the information constructs conrm
that herding in disclosures in partly driven by informational incentives, and that
rms do take advantage of the information reected in the disclosures of other rms.
Moreover, while decreases (increases) in future capital expenditures is not a clear
cut signal of bad news (good news), the ndings do suggest that there is a bad
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news/good news effect between the information content of prior disclosures and the
tendency to herd.
The negative and signicant coefcient on the interaction between REPO and
PCT DI SC suggests that herding in forecast decisions is also driven by reputa-
tional incentives. Specically, the coefcient indicates that the tendency to herd is
higher for less reputable managers in comparison to more reputable ones. That is,
the total effect of PCT DI SC on the propensity to disclose decreases by 0.70% for
every one-unit increase in REPO .
The main effect of REPO is positive and shows that the propensity to disclose
is increasing in the level of managerial reputation. However, the results for each
sub-sample show that reputation plays a much greater role in the decision to fore-
cast 2001 expenditures. Given the decline in average rm performance during this
period, this suggests that high-ability managers are more likely to disclose rele-
vant capital expenditure information when faced with adverse economic changes.
This is consistent with Trueman's (1986) argument that high-ability managers have
greater incentives to voluntarily release information in order to signal their ability
to anticipate economic changes in the rm's environment.
As expected, the coefcients on HERF and CAP I NT show that the propen-
sity to disclose capital expenditure forecasts increases with the level of product
market concentration and the degree of rm capital intensity. In other words, lower
product market competition and higher barriers to entry decrease proprietary dis-
closure costs which in turn leads to higher levels of disclosure. H5 proposes that
the tendency to herd will be higher for rms facing relatively high industry rivalry.
The coefcients on the interactions of HERF and CAP I NT with PCT DI SC
corroborate this hypothesis. Specically, the effect of other rms' past disclosure
decisions is greater for rms in low-concentration industries and rms with low
capital requirements.
46
The estimated coefcients on the control variables are consistent with prior re-
search. Specically, analyst following and rm size increase the forecast propen-
sity, whereas proprietary costs decrease it. The results of the separate regressions
for each forecast period provide some evidence that information asymmetry and
the issuance of debt or equity positively impacts the forecast propensity. Also,
the results show that both positive deviations in capital expenditures and negative
deviations in earnings increase the forecast propensity. This indicates that rms in-
crease disclosure when expenditures exceed the industry average and when relative
performance is poor. In contrast, the propensity to disclose decreases when capital
expenditures exceed the industry average.
6.2 The by-risk pool PWP hazard model
The PWPmodel does not assume that variable effects differ across risk pools. How-
ever, I re-estimate the PWP model separately for each risk pool in order to allow
the variable effects to vary by forecast number. Table 5 presents separate results for
rms at risk of issuing the rst and second forecast and those at risk of issuing three
or more forecasts. As in the stratied model, each forecast event is allowed its own
baseline hazard; here, each variable's effect on the hazard is also allowed to vary
for each subsequent forecast.
The results in column 1 are similar to those from traditional duration models
which simply estimate variable effects for the rst forecast event. Comparing col-
umn 1 of Table 5 with the results in column 1 of Table 4, it is clear that traditional
models overestimate variable effects relative to the PWP model. From the results
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, the effect of the limited risk pools is immediately
apparent. Estimates for each subsequent forecast are based on successively smaller
numbers of observations, resulting in a uniform decrease in the z-statistics across
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the columns. Similarly, the overall signicance of the models decreases with the in-
creasing number of forecasts, thus indicating that the model performs progressively
worse in explaining the forecast rate as more forecasts occur. Together, these results
are consistent with the warnings of prior research which suggest possible efciency
losses of event-specic variable effects (e.g., Wei, Lin, & Weissfeld 1989). Hence,
caution must be exercised when interpreting these results.
Nevertheless, the results reveal interesting aspects of the nature and effects of
repeated forecast events. The signs of most of the estimated coefcients are stable
across the risk pools. For those that uctuate, in most cases, the coefcients are not
precise enough to conclude that the uctuation is not merely a statistical artifact.
The effect of PCT DI SC is positive for all three risk pools but signicant for only
the rst and third. This indicates that incentives to herd are present for only the ini-
tial forecast and the third or higher revisions. The effects of managerial reputation
largely disappear after the initial forecast event but their signs are stable across all
three risk pools. Interestingly, the interactions between PCT DI SC and the proxies
for rms' competitive environment are strongly signicant for all risk pools.
Overall, the results from Table 5, together with the variations in the cumula-
tive hazard for each forecast event as plotted in Figure 8, provide strong evidence
that the forecast hazard varies signicantly by forecast number. More importantly,
the evidence suggests that factors other than those typically used in the voluntary
disclosure literature may better explain the propensity to issue forecast revisions.
Finally, the results clearly show that the PWP model is superior to traditional dura-
tion models when analyzing multiple disclosure events.
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6.3 The PWP hazard model with xed industry ef-
fects
As noted beforehand, the convergence among rms' disclosure decisions may be
simply because rms have similar information to disclose and have similar private
information of the net benets of disclosure. Since this study is more concerned
with convergence due to the interdependence among rms' disclosure decisions, it
is necessary to control for unobserved factors which may be independently causing
same-industry rms to disclose expenditure forecasts in parallel. This is done by re-
estimating the PWP model with xed within-industry effects. In Cox regressions,
xed industry effects can be included using either industry dummy variables or
industry stratications. Prior research shows that stratied effects are more efcient
than dummy variables. This is because industry stratications allow the baseline
hazard and thus the shape of the function to vary across industries. The PWP model
with industry stratications is of the form:
h jk [t j X.t/; k   1] D h j0k.t   tk 1/ exp
h
X jk .t/
i
(6.1)
where the baseline hazard function is estimated separately for each industry and
each disclosure event. Given this form, equation 4.9 is rewritten as follows:
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h jk [t j X.t/; k   1] D
h j0k.t   tk 1/ exp
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Column 1 of Table 6 presents results for the PWP model stratied by indus-
try. Comparative results for the PWP model with industry dummies are presented
in column 2. With the exception of the information content constructs, the esti-
mated coefcients from both specications are largely similar to those presented
in Table 4. The estimated coefcients for NEG_I N FO and POS_I N FO are
no longer signicant. However, this is possibly due to the high mathematical cor-
relation among PCT DI SC , I N D_I N FO , and I N D_SPEC resulting from the
similarity in their measurements. Overall the results from both xed effects regres-
sions conrm that the previous ndings and their interpretations are not driven by
random convergence due to unobserved within-industry factors.
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Chapter 7
Sensitivity Analyses
To test the robustness of the results, I perform several sensitivity checks. Except
where noted, I nd that the study's hypotheses continue to be accepted after the
following analyses:
7.1 Alternative specication of managerial reputation
I redene managerial reputation using two separate proxiesthe tenure and age of
chief executive ofcers (CEOs). Tenure and age are widely used in prior research
to examine managers' career and reputation concerns (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy
1992) and the effect on these concerns on tendencies to herd (e.g., Chevalier and
Ellison 1999). For all sample rms, I use the ExecuComp database to identify the
appointment and termination dates of each CEO and their age. CEOs with a termi-
nation date before or during the rst week of 4Q 1999, or missing appointment and
termination dates are excluded. CEO tenure is dened as the number of calendar
years from the rst year of appointment. The data requirement for CEO tenure re-
duces the sample to 65,087 rm/weeks (794 rms) while for CEO age, the sample
reduces to 43,493 rm/weeks (450 rms). When managerial reputation is redened
using CEO tenure, the main effect and the interaction with PCT DI SC is not sig-
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nicantly different from zero. However, when CEO age is used, the main and inter-
action effects are signicant and consistent with arguments of reputational herding.
Specically, the coefcients conrm that younger managers are more likely to herd
in their disclosure decisions relative to older managers.
7.2 Historical disclosure policies
Prior research indicates that rms with a history of disclosing forward-looking in-
formation are more likely to do so in current periods (e.g., Gibbins, Richardson,
and Waterhouse 1990; Miller and Piotroski 2001). This is investigated by including
a dummy variable, PRI ORDI SC , which equals 1 for those rms that released
a capital expenditure forecast in the prior forecast period; 0 otherwise. Since
the disclosure behavior of sample rms prior to the 4Q 1999 is unavailable, this
analysis is conducted only for the 2001 period and for those rms that exist in
the sample during both periods. Of the remaining 389 forecasts for 2001, 203 are
issued by rms which also released a forecast in the previous period. I also inter-
act PRI ORDI SC with PCT DI SC so as to investigate whether the tendency to
herd varies based on prior disclosure history. Consistent with prior evidence, the
coefcient on PRI ORDI SC is signicant and positive. The coefcient on the
interaction term is signicantly negative thus indicating that rms with disclosure
norms are less likely to herd.
The above nding is consistent with arguments of reputational herding as rms
with set disclosure strategies have higher disclosure credibility and thus, may ex-
hibit lower tendencies to herd. However, it must be noted that rms with set disclo-
sure policies can still engage in herd behavior simply by shifting the timing of their
disclosures. Since rms which do not shift the timing of their disclosures are prob-
ably not herding, I detect and delete 23 rms which issued forecasts in the same
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week in both forecast periods. Again, the main results and their interpretations
remain unchanged.
7.3 Fixed quarterly effects
Given the distinct differences in the forecast rate over both disclosure periods, I
control for seasonal differences in disclosure behavior by including a dummy vari-
able for each scal quarter. The magnitude and signicance of all variable effects
are unchanged from those presented in Table 4. The coefcients on the quarterly
dummies indicate signicant differences in the forecast rate in only 2Q 2000 and
1Q 2001.
7.4 The implementation of Regulation Fair Disclo-
sure
I also control for the likelihood that the results may be confounded by the im-
pact of Reg FD on rms disclosure strategies. An indicator variable (REGFD)
which equals 1 for the week of October 23, 2000 and all weeks thereafter (0
otherwise) is included in the model. The coefcient for REGFD is positive and
signicant, and is consistent with prior studies which show that the implementation
of Reg FD resulted in rms increasing the frequency of their voluntary disclosures.
However, even after controlling for the effects of Reg FD, the coefcients of the
study's primary variables and their interpretations remain largely unchanged.
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7.5 Loss and high-technology rms
Prior research nds that rms are more likely to disclose supplemental information
when current earnings are less informative, or when future earnings are more un-
certain (e.g., Tasker 1998; Chen, Defond, and Park 2002). Loss rms and high-
tech rms have less value-relevant earnings and more uncertain future earnings
(Hayn 1995; Francis and Schipper 1999). However, contrasting evidence shows
that high-tech rms are less likely to engage in voluntary disclosures due to either
high strategic disclosure costs or high litigation costs. To investigate these effects,
I include dummy variables indicating those observations with current quarter earn-
ings less than or equal to zero (LOSS), and those rms operating in high-tech
industries (H IT ECH ). Industries classied as high-tech are the semi-conductor
(chips), computers, pharmaceutical, electrical equipment, measuring and control
equipment, and medical equipment industries. This classication scheme is con-
sistent with Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995).
Industry classications are dened by Fama and French (1997).
The estimated coefcients on LOSS and H IT ECH are signicantly positive
and negative, respectively. Thus, indicating that loss rms are more likely to pro-
vide capital expenditure forecasts, while high-tech rms are less likely to do so.
The ndings for high-tech rms are consistent with prior evidence which suggests
that high proprietary costs deter disclosure of forward-looking information.
It can also be argued that loss and high-tech rms are less-informed of the po-
tential benets of disclosure due to either their poor nancial information environ-
ments or the greater uncertainty of their future performance. As such, these rms
may be more likely to herd in their disclosure decisions so as to gain informational
advantages from the past decisions of presumably better-informed rms. To in-
vestigate these arguments, I interact PCT DI SC with the LOSS and H IT ECH
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dummy variables and re-estimate the model. The coefcients on the interaction
terms are both positive and signicant thus indicating that rms with poor infor-
mation environments and/or more uncertain future performance are more likely to
herd in their disclosure decisions. This nding in consistent with theories of in-
formational herding and provides strong additional support for the argument that
herding in disclosures is partly due to informational incentives.
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
An area of corporate disclosure behavior that has received little attention is the
interaction of voluntary disclosure practices among rms. That is, the inuence of
one rm's disclosure decisions on the disclosure decisions of other related rms.
This study attempts to ll this gap by focusing on the dynamics of herd behavior in
the decision to disclose capital expenditure forecasts. Consistent with theories of
herding, I nd that the propensity to release a forecast is increasing in the fraction of
disclosing rms within the industry. Moreover, I nd that this association is higher
for less capital-intensive rms and rms operating in highly competitive industries.
Thus, indicating that relatively high industry rivalry may lead rms to herd in their
capital expenditure forecast decisions.
In addition to detecting herd behavior in capital expenditure forecasts, this study
provides further evidence of why managers choose to follow the disclosure deci-
sions of related rms. Two possible reasons for the behavior aremanagers' use
of information reected in the past disclosure decisions of other rms (informa-
tional herding) and managerial incentives to maintain or build a good reputation
with investors (reputational herding). The results of the analyses show that the ten-
dency to herd is higher for relatively less reputable managers, and that managers
are more likely to disclose expenditure information when prior peer forecasts sig-
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nal a decrease in future capital spending and are relatively precise. Overall, these
ndings indicate that both informational and reputational incentives can lead man-
agers to herd in their disclosure decisions. Therefore, future studies of herding in
disclosures should not disregard the possible effects of either of these two factors.
Extensive sensitivity analyses conrm the robustness of the study's ndings as
well as provide interesting additional ndings. Specically, further analyses show
that loss-generating rms and rms operating in high-tech industries are more likely
to herd in their disclosure decisions. Consistent with arguments of informational
herding, this suggests that poor nancial information environments and high uncer-
tainty of future performance may create informational incentives for rms to engage
in herd behavior. In addition, consistent with theories of reputational herding, I nd
that younger managers and rms with set disclosure strategies are less likely to herd
in their forecast decisions.
The results of this study has several limitations. First, an important challenge
for any empirical study of herding is to rule out random convergence. It is possi-
ble that some unobserved factor may be driving rms to disclose in parallel, even
when there is no interaction between the disclosure decisions. While controlling
for xed industry effects alleviates concerns of random convergence, it is still likely
that omitted rm-specic factors may be creating the appearance of interactive con-
vergence in disclosure decisions. Second, there are potential biases relating to the
size of disclosing rms in the sample, which are larger than the average rm. Third,
missing data and sample selection biases may eliminate rms which are not herding
in their disclosure decisions.
This study contributes to both the voluntary disclosure and herding literature
by providing previously undocumented evidence of herding in corporate disclosure
practices. Moreover, it attributes herding in disclosures to both informational and
reputational incentives. This is in contrast to most empirical studies of herding
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which examines only one or none of these incentives. Finally, the study employs
a conditional duration model which is more suitable for multiple disclosure events,
and which allows the probability of disclosure to vary across time and across fore-
cast events.
The ndings of this study highlights numerous extensions for future research.
One such extension is whether managers herd in the content of their disclosures.
For example, are managers more likely to disclose good (bad) news when other
rms disclose good (bad) news? While the results of the study suggest that man-
agers' disclosure choices are conditional on the content of other rms' disclosures,
additional analyses are required to provide direct evidence of herding in disclosure
content. Another important extension hinges on the expectation that a wait-and-see
approach to disclosure will increase information asymmetries between rms and
capital market participants. If this is the case, then it remains an open question as
to whether herd behavior in voluntary disclosures impacts rms' costs of capital
and/or their access to external nancing.
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Appendix 1 
 
Variable definitions 
 
Herd parameter 
PCTDISC 
the ratio of the number of same-industry firms excluding firm i that have issued a capital 
expenditure forecast in the weeks [1,…, (t-1)] to the total number of industry firms 
excluding firm i. 
Industry competition 
HERF the Herfindahl Index for industry j is measured as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual firm.  
CAPINT the level of current period capital intensity for firm i measured as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (long-term assets) to total assets. 
Managerial reputation 
REP 
equals “1” if firm i is included in Fortune's annual America's Most Admired Companies 
survey in at least one of the 3 years preceding the current annual disclosure period; “0” 
otherwise. 
Information content and specificity 
INFO 
measure of the information content of the forecast issued by firm i in industry j during week 
t. Equals “-1” if a decrease in capital expenditures relative to last year’s total is forecasted; 
“1” if a capital expenditure increase is forecasted; and “0” if no change, or ambiguous or no 
information is reported. 
IND_INFO ratio of the sum of INFO for all firms in industry j excluding firm i to the total number of firms in industry j excluding firm i. 
NEG_INFO equals IND_INFO if IND_INFO is less than zero; “0” otherwise. 
POS_INFO equals IND_INFO if IND_INFO is greater than or equal to zero; “0” otherwise. 
SPEC 
specificity of the capital expenditure forecast issued by firm i in industry j during week t. 
Equals “1” for qualitative forecasts; “2” for open-ended estimates (minimum or maximum); 
“3” for range estimates; and “4” for point estimates. 
IND_SPEC ratio of the sum of SPEC for all firms in industry j excluding firm i to the total number of disclosing firms in industry j excluding firm i. 
Controls 
CAPDEV 
standardized deviation from industry capital expenditures for firm i in week t measured as 
total capital expenditures for firm i less mean capital expenditures for all  firms within the 
industry excluding firm i scaled by the standard deviation of industry capital expenditures. 
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NEG_CAPDEV equals CAPDEV if CAPDEV is less than zero; “0” otherwise. 
POS_CAPDEV equals CAPDEV if CAPDEV is greater than or equal to zero; “0” otherwise. 
EPSDEV 
standardized deviation from industry earnings for firm i in week t measured as earnings 
per share for firm i less mean earnings per share for all firms within the industry 
excluding firm i scaled by the standard deviation of industry earnings per share. 
NEG_EPSDEV equals EPSDEV if EPSDEV is less than zero; “0” otherwise. 
POS_EPSDEV equals EPSDEV if EPSDEV is greater than or equal to zero; “0” otherwise. 
FOLLOW 
the number of analysts issuing earnings estimates for firm i as at the end of week t-1 . 
This measure is based on the last available analyst forecast information in the First Call 
database prior to the end of week t-1. 
MB the level of proprietary disclosure costs as at the end of week t-1 measured as the ratio of market value to book value of common equity. 
SIZE the size of firm i as at the end of week t-1 measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity. 
DISPERSE 
the dispersion in analyst forecasts for firm i as at the end of week t-1 measured as the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the median forecast.  This measure is 
based on the last available analyst forecast information in the First Call database prior to 
the end of week t-1. 
LIQ 
the level of liquidity for firm i at the end of week t-1 measured as the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the volume of shares traded in week t-1 to total shares outstanding as at 
the end of week t-1. 
ISSUE equals “1” if firm i registers a public debt or equity offering in the two years following the week t; “0” otherwise. 
EARNREL equals “1” for the weeks that firm i reports its annual or quarterly earnings; “0” otherwise. 
Release Date
Information 
content          
(INFO)
Information 
specificity        
(SPEC) Content of CAPEX Disclosure
Transportation
7/18/2001 Decrease (-1) Point (4)
UAL Corp.(UAL) will put the brakes on growth plans for its United Airlines unit for the next several 
years, executives told analysts in a conference call Wednesday. United Airlines president Rono Dutta 
said the nation's number two carrier will go forward with $1.4 billion of capital  spending this year. 
However, the company is deferring some aircraft deliveries through 2003, and plans to tail off aircraft 
capital spending "to zero" by 2004. 
7/18/2001 Decrease (-1) Qualitative (1)
 The nosedive in second quarter business passenger bookings hit AMR Corp.(AMR), parent of 
American Airlines and TWA Airlines, hard on the bottom line, Chief Financial Officer Tom Horton, 
told analysts in a conference call Wednesday.AMR will continue to look for ways to cut costs. The 
company has cut $1 billion of capital spending for the next two years, and, through attrition, will cut 
down the size of its corporate staff.
7/19/2001 Increase (1) Point (4)
Despite across-the-board cost-cutting, including some layoffs, that will reduce second-half expenses by 
$135 million, Northwest Airlines Corp. (NWAC) has no plans to delay or cut orders for new aircraft, 
executives said in a conference call with analysts Thursday....Mickey Foret, chief financial officer, said 
the nation's fourth-largest air carrier has financing in place, through its own resources and with vendors, 
to take delivery on new planes as planned. Capital spending, including aircraft, is projected to be $1 
billion in 2001, $1.8 billion in 2002 and $1.9 billion in 2003. 
Sample capital expenditure forecasts
Appendix 2
Capital expenditure forecasts are collected from the following business press sources: Business Wire , PR Newswire , The Dow Jones News Service , and 
The Wall Street Journal . Information content is measured as the expected change in capital expenditures relative to last year's total expenditures - 
decrease = “-1”, increase = “1”, and no change or ambiquous information = “0”. Information specificity equals “1” for point estimates, “2” for range 
estimates, “3” for open-ended estimates (minimum or maximum), and “4” for qualitative estimates.
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Release Date
Information 
content          
(INFO)
Information 
specificity        
(SPEC) Content of CAPEX Disclosure
10/19/2000 No change (0) Range (3)
Focal Communications Corp.'s (FCOM) capital expenditures for 2001 will probably equal the $305 
million to $307 million the company estimates it will spend in 2000, Chief Operating Officer John 
Barnicle said. Speaking at a Kaufman Brothers LP investor conference here Thursday, Barnicle said 
Focal should see "consistent capital spending" over the next 18 months. 
10/23/2000 No change (0) Point (4)
Gutierrez and SBC Chief Financial Officer Donald Kiernan spoke on a conference call following the 
release of the company's third-quarter results. SBC exceeded Wall Street's projections, with the 
exception of its DSL rollout, which came in below analysts' expectations. SBC is on plan for capital 
spending of $13 billion in 2000, said Guitierrez. Kiernan said capital spending will be flat next year, 
with an estimated $1 billion spent on Cingular, its wireless joint venture with BellSouth Corp. (BLS) 
and the remaining $12 billion spent on wireline.
10/30/2000 Increase (1) Qualitative (1)
Verizon Communications (VZ) Vice Chairman and Chief Financial Officer Frederic Salerno said 
Monday that the integration of Bell Atlantic Corp. and GTE Corp., which merged in June to form 
Verizon, continues to proceed smoothly.  Verizon's capital spending, estimated at $18 billion for the 
year, may see a slight increase in 2001, he said.
11/2/2000 Increase (1) Point (4)
Time Warner Telecom Inc. (TWTC) Chief Financial Officer David Rayner estimated the company's 
capital expenditures for 2001 at $600 million. The estimate is $200 million above previous projections, 
reflecting the company's acquisition of GST Telecommunications Inc. (GSTXQ), he said at the Bear 
Stearns Global Communications conference here. Next year's capital spending, which will be used 
primarily for fiber construction, is up from an estimated $350 million for this year, he said.
Telecommunications
Appendix 2 cont'd
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Table 1
Descriptive analysis of the number of capital expenditure forecasts for the period 4Q 1999 to 3Q 2001
Total 2000 forecast period Total 2001 forecast period
1999 2000 2000 2001
4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
Number of forecasts 236 40 90 58 48 506 124 172 126 84
Number of forecasting firms 161 40 86 55 47 292 108 160 117 77
Number of firms initiating a forecast 161 40 72 29 20 292 108 111 51 22
Cumulative number of forecasting firms 40 112 141 161 108 219 270 292
Number of firms at risk as at quarter end 1376 1355 1156 1147 1140 1712 1669 1405 1384 1366
Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard as at quarter end 2.94% 10.69% 15.72% 19.91% 7.28% 19.45% 28.46% 34.55%
Table 1 presents the quarterly pattern of capital expenditure forecasts for all sample firms along with the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate as at the end of each quarter. 
The number of forecasts are analysed separately for each forecast period. The 2000 forecast period includes the four quarters, 4Q 1999 to 3Q 2000. The 2001 forecast period 
includes the four quarters, 4Q 2000 to 3Q 2001.  The Nelso-Aalen cumulative hazard estimate as at the end of each quarter is the cumulative sum of the ratio of forecasting 
firms to the total firms at risk during each weekly time interval.
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Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75%
Panel A: All firm/quarters in final sample 
(1981 firms)
Market Value of Equity 3,860.79 17,764.38 115.38 421.39 1559.4
ln(Market Value of Equity) 6.15 1.90 4.75 6.04 7.35
Sales 608.20 2,529.73 25.55 89.77 341.62
Earnings per share 0.06 1.17 -0.12 0.13 0.38
Net PPE 1,001.02 4,268.45 17.39 84.48 460.76
Total Assets 2,924.70 12,931.51 127.16 413.86 1553.3
Panel B: All firm/quarters with 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP data (7721 firms)
Market Value of Equity 2,305.92 14,788.84 35.93 146.39 691.69
ln(Market Value of Equity) 5.14 2.12 3.58 4.99 6.54
Sales 427.62 2,138.21 8.38 34.71 164.25
Earnings per share 0.08 10.74 -0.13 0.08 0.33
Net PPE 630.06 3,175.43 5.14 24.50 165.97
Total Assets 3,385.48 23,190.85 57.85 226.91 980.95
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the period 4Q 1999 to 3Q 2001
Comparative quarterly data are presented for the full sample and all firms in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT database. 
Quarterly data are presented since sales, earnings, and asset data are not available on a weekly basis. Panel A 
presents statistics for all firm/quarters (1981 firms) in the final full sample. Panel B presents the decriptive statistics 
for all firms with available quarterly data in the COMPUSTAT/CRSP database for the eight quarters, 4Q 1999 to 3Q 
2001. Panel C presents statistics for all quarters in which the firm is classified as a disclosing firm. Panel D presents 
statistics for all quarters in which the firm is classified as a nondisclosing firm. For each forecast period, a firm is 
classified as a disclosing (nondisclosing) firm if it issues one or more forecasts (no forecast). The sum of the number 
of firms in Panels C and D differs from the total sample firms as 239 firms are classified as a nondisclosing firm in 
one forecast period but as a disclosing firm in the other. Market value of equity is equal to beginning of quarter share 
price times total shares outstanding. The natural log of market value of equity corrects for skewness in the 
distribution. Earnings per share is quarterly earnings before extraordinary items. Net PPE is net property plant and 
equipment. With the exception of earnings per share and the natural log of market value of equity, all variables are 
presented in $ millions.
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Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75%
Panel C: Disclosing firm/quarters in final 
sample (354 firms)
Market Value of Equity 10,700.03 34,447.75 327.81 1,113.85 4901.75
ln(Market Value of Equity) 7.16 2.05 5.79 7.02 8.5
Sales 1,782.98 5,527.29 77.03 287.29 1092.4
Earnings per share 0.20 1.54 -0.03 0.27 0.59
Net PPE 3,466.49 9,397.43 191.40 684.75 2557.1
Total Assets 9,275.74 28,954.87 522.74 1,629.30 5817.3
Panel D: Nondisclosing firm/quarters in final 
sample (1805 firms)
Market Value of Equity 2,507.12 11,497.23 102.02 345.49 1248.71
ln(Market Value of Equity) 5.95 1.81 4.63 5.84 7.13
Sales 375.68 1,137.95 21.65 72.52 250.96
Earnings per share 0.04 1.08 -0.13 0.11 0.34
Net PPE 513.04 1,706.91 13.13 55.99 274.87
Total Assets 1,667.66 4,989.78 109.34 327.78 1068.12
Table 2 cont'd
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Mean Std Dev 50% Mean Std Dev 50% Mean Std Dev 50%
Panel A
Weeks to Disclosure 24.21 12.96 23.00 25.14 13.08 22.00 23.77 12.90 24.00
Panel B
Continuous Variables
PCTDISC 8.97 13.01 4.76 6.82 11.36 2.67 10.72 13.97 5.82
HERF 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.12
CAPINT 29.72 24.88 21.13 31.70 25.69 23.18 28.11 24.07 19.91
IND_INFO 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00
IND_SPEC 2.52 1.71 2.50 1.97 1.57 1.33 2.97 1.69 3.00
CAPDEV -0.01 0.94 0.22 -0.01 0.94 0.22 -0.01 0.93 -0.21
EPSDEV 0.00 0.92 0.09 0.00 0.94 0.04 0.01 0.90 0.12
FOLLOW 6.04 5.62 4.00 5.91 5.44 4.00 6.13 5.76 4.00
SIZE 6.13 1.90 6.02 6.18 1.88 6.10 6.09 1.92 5.94
MB 3.86 5.89 2.09 4.23 6.73 2.14 3.55 5.09 2.06
DISPERSE 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.01 0.03 0.42 0.01
LIQ -3.89 1.16 3.86 -3.86 1.14 3.85 -3.92 1.18 -3.87
EPS 0.06 1.17 0.13 0.18 0.64 0.18 -0.03 1.45 0.09
CAPEX 132.21 785.11 11.41 129.66 769.40 12.59 134.29 797.73 10.64
2000 forecast period 2001 forecast period
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for PWP model variables for the period 4Q 1999 to 3Q 2001
Full sample
Descriptive statistics are presented for the full sample and separately for each forecast period. The 2000 forecast period includes 
the four quarters, 4Q 1999 to 3Q 2000. The 2001 forecast period includes the four quarters, 4Q 2000 to 3Q 2001. Panel A reports 
descriptive data for the weeks to disclosure (duration times). The time to disclosure is calculated using interevent time. Panel B 
presents descriptive data for all continuous independent variables as well as quarterly earnings per share (EPS) and quarterly 
capital expenditures in $ millions (CAPEX). All other variables are as defined in Appendix 1. All variables for the full sample 
and each sub-sample are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels.
 66
Coefficient
Unit ∆ in 
Hazard (%)
Std Dev ∆ in 
Hazard (%)
2000          
Coefficient
2001          
Coefficient
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCTDISC 0.0560 5.76 107.16 0.0685 0.0373
[6.56]*** [3.13]*** [3.36]***
NEG_INFO 1.0304 180.22 3.34 10.8584 1.1428
[0.81] [1.89]* [0.84]
POS_INFO -1.2175 -70.40 -11.48 -3.9671 -1.9751
[2.46]** [2.41]** [2.75]***
IND_SPEC 0.1625 17.64 32.02 0.1048 0.1397
[4.67]*** [1.29] [3.22]***
REPO 0.3108 36.45 36.45 0.1804 0.3944
[6.00]*** [2.01]** [6.50]***
REPO x PCTDISC -0.0070 -0.70 -10.67 -0.0020 -0.0092
[3.82]*** [0.61] [3.90]***
PWP conditional interevent hazard model for multiple capital expenditure forecasts
TABLE 4
By forecast periodFull sample
Columns 1 present results from the estimation of the PWP model for the full sample. The superscript O indicates 
orthogonalization. The variables REP, FOLLOW, and SIZE are orthogonalized so as to remove biases of firm size 
and corporate visibility from the reputation indicator. Columns 2 and 3 presents the one-unit and one-standard-
deviation percentage change in the hazard rate for each variable, respectively. The one-unit percentage change for 
each variable r is calculated as 100[exp(β r)-1]. For continuous variables, the one-standard-deviation change is 
calculated as 100[exp(srβr)-1], where sr is the sample standard deviation of variable r. For indicator variables, the one-
standard-deviation change is based on a change from 0 to 1 and therefore, equals the one-unit change. The one-
standard-deviation change for orthogonalized variables is also equal to the one-unit change since orthogonalization 
produces normalized variables with a standard deviation of 1. Columns 4 and 5 present results from the estimation of 
the PWP model for the 2000 and 2001 forecast periods, respectively. The 2000 period includes the four quarters, 4Q 
1999 to 3Q 2000. The 2001 forecast period includes the four quarters, 4Q 2000 to 3Q 2001. All models are estimated 
in interevent time. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. All continuous variables for the full sample and each sub-
sample are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. The z-statistics are computed 
using Lin and Wei's (1989) robust variance estimates. The Efron (1977) method is used to handle tied disclosure 
events. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald χ2 
statistic for all models are significant at the 1% level. The PWP model is:
hkt ∣ Xt, k − 1 
h0kt − tk−1exp
1PCTDISCk  2NEG_INFOk 
3POS_INFOk  4IND_SPECk 
5REPkO  6REPkOPCTDISCk 
7HERFk  8HERFkPCTDISCk 
9CAPINTk  10CAPINTkPCTDISCk 
11NEG_CAPDEVk  12POS_CAPDEVk 
13NEG_EPSDEVk  14POS_EPSDEVk 
15FOLLOWkO  16SIZEkO  17MBk 
18DISPERSEk  19LIQk  20ISSUEk 
21EARNRELk
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Coefficient
Unit ∆ in 
Hazard (%)
Std Dev ∆ in 
Hazard (%)
2000          
Coefficient
2001          
Coefficient
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HERF 2.5808 1220.77 23.24 3.0952 0.9219
[5.13]*** [3.84]*** [1.24]
HERF x PCTDISC -0.1166 -11.01 -30.28 -0.1027 -0.001
[4.07]*** [1.65]* [0.02]
CAPINT 0.0221 2.23 73.28 0.0271 0.0230
[10.41]*** [7.83]*** [9.35]***
CAPINT x PCTDISC -0.0003 -0.03 -24.60 -0.0003 -0.0003
[3.26]*** [1.45] [3.08]***
NEG_CAPDEV 0.0732 7.59 4.47 0.0980 0.0638
[1.65]* [1.34] [1.27]
POS_CAPDEV 0.1033 10.88 7.65 0.2115 0.0497
[2.29]** [3.11]*** [1.15]
NEG_EPSDEV -0.2364 -21.05 -13.80 -0.2321 -0.2446
[3.86]*** [2.29]** [3.59]***
POS_EPSDEV 0.0401 4.09 2.06 -0.0258 0.0765
[0.56] [0.21] [0.90]
FOLLOWO 0.2458 27.86 27.86 0.1527 0.3051
[5.33]*** [2.13]** [6.28]***
SIZEO 0.1984 21.95 21.95 0.3000 0.1727
[3.71]*** [3.38]*** [2.99]***
MB -0.0206 -2.04 -11.43 -0.0005 -0.0403
[1.74]* [0.04] [2.33]**
DISPERSE 0.1052 11.09 4.12 0.3971 0.0406
[1.12] [2.94]*** [0.35]
LIQ 0.0160 1.61 1.88 0.0294 -0.0074
[0.32] [0.36] [0.14]
ISSUE 0.0931 9.76 9.76 -0.1392 0.1749
[1.04] [0.90] [1.86]*
EARNREL 2.5935 1237.65 1237.65 2.2945 2.7721
[23.51]*** [12.04]*** [21.91]***
Number of Observations 139242 62675 76567
Number of Firms 1981 1376 1712
Number of Forecasts 742 236 506
Full sample By forecast period
TABLE 4 cont'd
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1st forecast 2nd forecast >3 forecasts
Variable (1) (2) (3)
PCTDISC 0.0632 0.0085 0.0607
[5.09]*** [0.42] [2.51]**
NEG_INFO 1.4964 0.4869 2.1907
[0.69] [0.20] [0.79]
POS_INFO -1.3670 -0.2501 1.1314
[1.80]* [0.26] [0.73]
IND_SPEC 0.1691 0.1248 -0.0540
[3.91]*** [1.77]* [0.49]
REPO 0.3161 0.0115 0.2027
[4.76]*** [0.11] [1.22]
REPO x PCTDISC -0.0048 -0.0028 -0.0004
[1.64] [0.79] [0.08]
HERF 3.1944 0.9959 0.1136
[5.76]*** [0.73] [0.07]
HERF x PCTDISC -0.1029 -0.1785 -0.2832
[3.11]*** [1.89]* [2.50]**
TABLE 5
By-Risk Pool PWP conditional hazard model
Coefficient
Columns 1 to 3 present results for the first forecast event, the second forecast event, and three or 
more forecasts, respectively. The superscript O indicates orthogonalization. The variables REP, 
FOLLOW, and SIZE are orthogonalized so as to remove biases of firm size and corporate visibility 
from the reputation indicator. Results are presented only for the full sample. All models are estimated
in interevent time. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. The z-statistics are computed using 
Lin and Wei's (1989) robust variance estimates. The Efron (1977) method is used to handle tied 
disclosure events. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The Wald χ2 statistic for all models are significant at the 1% level. The PWP model is:
hkt ∣ Xt, k − 1 
h0kt − tk−1exp
1PCTDISCk  2NEG_INFOk 
3POS_INFOk  4IND_SPECk 
5REPkO  6REPkOPCTDISCk 
7HERFk  8HERFkPCTDISCk 
9CAPINTk  10CAPINTkPCTDISCk 
11NEG_CAPDEVk  12POS_CAPDEVk 
13NEG_EPSDEVk  14POS_EPSDEVk 
15FOLLOWkO  16SIZEkO  17MBk 
18DISPERSEk  19LIQk  20ISSUEk 
21EARNRELk
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1st forecast 2nd forecast >3 forecasts
Variable (1) (2) (3)
CAPINT 0.0239 -0.0020 0.0100
[9.68]*** [0.39] [0.94]
CAPINT x PCTDISC -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001
[1.92]* [2.11]** [0.26]
NEG_CAPDEV 0.0997 0.1334 -0.0450
[1.51] [1.56] [0.36]
POS_CAPDEV 0.1172 0.1698 0.0484
[2.11]** [2.54]** [0.38]
NEG_EPSDEV -0.2543 -0.1095 -0.3413
[3.40]*** [1.16] [2.38]**
POS_EPSDEV 0.1615 0.0146 -0.2323
[1.67]* [0.11] [0.96]
FOLLOWO 0.2452 0.1117 0.2749
[4.19]*** [1.36] [2.00]**
SIZEO 0.2482 -0.0015 0.2273
[3.90]*** [0.02] [1.59]
MB -0.0156 -0.0416 -0.0351
[1.08] [2.14]** [0.82]
DISPERSE 0.1759 -0.0193 0.3351
[1.87]* [0.12] [1.10]
LIQ 0.0175 -0.0544 0.1013
[0.32] [0.61] [0.67]
ISSUE 0.2333 -0.0003 -0.2787
[2.11]** [0.00] [1.11]
EARNREL 2.4128 2.8639 3.0342
[18.95]*** [14.32]*** [8.53]***
Number of Observations 125178 9719 4345
Number of Firms 1981 354 150
Number of Forecasts 453 185 104
Coefficient
TABLE 5 cont'd
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TABLE 6
PWP conditional hazard model with fixed industry effects
Coefficient
Model stratified by         
industry
Model with industry 
dummies
Variable (1) (2)
PCTDISC 0.0451 0.0307
[2.86]*** [3.14]***
NEG_INFO -0.5955 -1.3067
[0.35] [0.92]
POS_INFO -0.0678 -0.4801
[0.10] [0.94]
IND_SPEC 0.1667 0.1052
[2.91]*** [2.63]***
REPO 0.2967 0.2971
[4.95]*** [5.34]***
REPO x PCTDISC -0.0071 -0.0064
[2.90]*** [3.49]***
HERF 2.2908 2.2531
[1.65]* [2.14]**
HERF x PCTDISC -0.1744 -0.1253
[2.36]** [3.43]***
Column 1 presents results for the PWP model stratified by industry. Column 2 presents results for 
the PWP model with industry dummy variables. The superscript O indicates orthogonalization. 
The variables REP, FOLLOW, and SIZE are orthogonalized so as to remove biases of firm size 
and corporate visibility from the reputation indicator. Results are presented only for the full 
sample. All models are estimated in interevent time. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. Robust z-statistics are in 
brackets. The z-statistics are computed using Lin and Wei's (1989) robust variance estimates. The 
Efron (1977) method is used to handle tied disclosure events. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Wald χ2 statistic for all models are 
significant at the 1% level. The PWP model stratified by industry is:
hk
j t ∣ Xt, k − 1 
h0k
j t − tk−1exp
1PCTDISCkj  2NEG_INFOkj 
3POS_INFOkj  4IND_SPECkj 
5REPkj  6REPkPCTDISCkj  
7HERFkj  8HERFkj PCTDISCkj  
9CAPINTkj  10CAPINTkj PCTDISCkj  
11NEG_CAPDEVkj  12POS_CAPDEVkj 
13NEG_EPSDEVkj  14POS_EPSDEVkj 
15FOLLOWkj  16SIZEkj  17MBkj 
18DISPERSEkj  19LIQkj  20ISSUEkj 
21EARNRELkj
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TABLE 6 cont'd
Coefficient
Model stratified by         
industry
Model with industry 
dummies
Variable (1) (2)
CAPINT 0.0195 0.0215
[6.06]*** [6.81]***
CAPINT x PCTDISC -0.0001 -0.0002
[0.37] [2.45]**
NEG_CAPDEV 0.129 0.0854
[3.05]*** [2.00]**
POS_CAPDEV 0.139 0.1348
[2.87]*** [3.04]***
NEG_EPSDEV -0.1694 -0.2173
[2.35]** [3.23]***
POS_EPSDEV 0.0705 0.0401
[0.94] [0.56]
FOLLOWO 0.1245 0.1693
[2.37]** [3.49]***
SIZEO 0.1537 0.1779
[2.78]*** [3.04]***
MB -0.0119 -0.02
[1.04] [1.69]*
DISPERSE 0.12 0.1005
[1.15] [1.06]
LIQ 0.0189 0.0365
[0.36] [0.71]
ISSUE 0.1333 0.1099
[1.44] [1.23]
EARNREL 2.579 2.5911
[23.22]*** [23.48]***
Number of Observations 139242 139242
Number of Firms 1981 1981
Number of Forecasts 742 742
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Figure 1 
A: Duration model for multiple capital expenditure forecasts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B: The measurement of duration times 
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Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function by level of competition 
A: 2000 forecasts B: 2001 forecasts
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Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function by degree of capital intensity 
A: 2000 forecasts B: 2001 forecasts
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